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Summary
1. An overview of scenario analysis methods
This study provides an introduction to scenario analysis as a tool for
development policy planning. The study is divided into three parts. The
first part of the study outlines the central characteristics of scenario
analysis methods, distinguishes scenario analysis from other research
approaches, and presents a general guide for building scenarios. Illus-
trations of applications of scenario analysis methods in fields related to
global development complement the methodological discussions in this
part of the study.
A second part of the study develops an original illustration of how sce-
nario methods can be applied to examine development policy issues by
focusing on the question of how foreign direct investment flows could
change the African development landscape toward the year 2030. This
chapter culminates with the presentation of four fictional narratives
charting how investment patterns and development outcomes could un-
fold over the next two decades.
The third and final chapter of the study outlines several considerations
that policymakers potentially interested in using scenario methods as a
supplement to their existing planning tools should make in evaluating
whether the application of these methods within their organizations is
desirable.
The term “scenario” has a theatrical connotation, reflecting the outline
of a plot that ties a story together. Scenarios can be considered to be
imagined narratives, or hypothetical sequences of events that explain
how possible futures can unfold. The emphasis that scenario analysts
place on exploring multiple alternative futures underlines that scenario
analysis does not purport to predict the future. Instead, scenario ana-
lysts generally aim to deal with future uncertainty by presenting a range
of possible outcomes that can be accepted as equally plausible.
From the 1950s onward, scenario analysis methods developed to sup-
port planning processes in the security arena, and became increasingly
popular in corporate settings from the 1970s onward. These methods
can fulfil several aims. By offering a tool for anticipating uncertain out-
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comes that can impact an organization’s ability to accomplish its goals
in the future, scenario analysis often serves a risk assessment and risk
management function, and the approach can also be used to evaluate
the robustness of adopting particular strategies. The process of scenario
construction can also serve to promote dialogue and to stretch the ex-
isting mental maps used within an organization to interpret the external
environment.
The scenario approach accommodates multiple methods. Scenarios
may be constructed with the assistance of quantitative modelling, may
rely more exclusively on qualitative research techniques, or may in-
volve a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches. While
they differ in terms of the type of information that they use to build sce-
narios, quantitative and qualitative scenario approaches share a basic
understanding of scenarios as fictional representations of the future.
The most prominent examples of quantitative scenario exercises in ar-
eas of relevance to global development policy are scenarios generated
with the aid of systems dynamics models that highlight how interac-
tions among central variables produce changes in the structures in
which these interactions take place. This approach to scenario building,
featured in Limits to Growth and applied by the International Futures
project, emphasizes non-linear developments as well as feedback ef-
fects. Drawbacks of these kinds of quantitative approaches include the
high demands of data collection that they impose as well as their lack
of open-endedness given the fixed quality of the models that underlie
scenario generation efforts.
Proponents of qualitative scenario approaches underline that qualita-
tive methods may be especially useful in drawing attention to questions
of cause and effect, exploring interaction effects, and anticipating fu-
ture surprise occurrences. Qualitative scenario exercises generally
adopt either a normative or an exploratory orientation.
In outlining the process of building scenarios, the study focuses on the
roadmap to scenario construction provided in the literature on the intu-
itive logics method, a qualitative scenario approach with an explorato-
ry orientation popularized by Shell and other leading scenario analysis
exponents. Key elements of this approach include its emphasis on
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drawing on tacit knowledge held within an organization and its focus
on isolating the most important and most uncertain drivers of change as
a basis for constructing scenario storylines.
Drivers of change are identified as variables that are considered to have
a determining influence over the direction that the future will take. The
scenario analysis literature points to several common categories of
drivers of change to consider, including demographic patterns, general
economic conditions, the nature of governmental systems and regula-
tion in a particular setting, technological forces, and international in-
fluences. Some driving forces may be more predictable than others, and
scenario builders are advised to separate constant and so-called prede-
termined drivers from unpredictable drivers. Developing scenarios
with reference to the most uncertain drivers ensures that scenarios will
reflect a wide range of possible futures. For the sake of simplification,
scenario builders may wish to construct a grid that juxtaposes the two
most important drivers of change along its axes. This scenario matrix
helps in organizing the narratives that illustrate how different trajecto-
ries of events unfold through time.
While the widespread use of scenario analysis provides an indication
that scenario methods are considered to be useful supplements to other
planning techniques, there are limited assessments of the utility of sce-
nario approaches in the scenario analysis literature. Indeed, existing
evaluations of scenario methods have been critical. Common scenario
analysis shortcomings have included an inadequate differentiation
among scenarios, the limited integration of unexpected occurrences in-
to storylines, and the presentation of overly vague policy recommen-
dations. The conclusion of this chapter suggests that analysts can im-
prove scenario analyses by ensuring that key stakeholders are involved
in the scenario development process and by attempting to narrow the
focus of the scenario exercise.
2. Scenario analysis and FDI to Africa
This section begins with a review of general global trends in foreign di-
rect investment (FDI). In comparison to other developing regions and
to the world as a whole, the African continent has traditionally been a
marginal investment destination, accounting for some 3 % of global
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FDI flows in recent years. Focusing on the future of investment in the
African context is relevant in exploring the future of development pol-
icy given that private investment potentially represents an important
source of external development finance and because Africa will con-
tinue to be the region of the world with the highest concentration of
less-developed and low income countries beyond the time horizon of
the Millennium Development Goals.
With respect to overall macroeconomic indicators, African economies
as a whole have performed well in recent years. Rising commodities
prices and fiscal discipline at the national level have contributed to
these positive outcomes. Nevertheless, the continent also continues to
face a variety of development challenges, including rising inequality
and high levels of absolute poverty.
African foreign direct investment trends have mirrored overall macro-
economic trends on the continent, increasing significantly since the be-
ginning of the decade. Yet investment inAfrica is concentrated both ge-
ographically and by sector. A small number of large economies (in-
cluding Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa) have attracted the lion’s
share of investment, while the natural resource sector has been
favoured across the continent. Diversification remains a major chal-
lenge for African economies.
To identify key drivers of investment patterns to Africa in the future,
the study reviews the literature on determinants of FDI flows. Deter-
minants of FDI include geographic factors such as proximity to major
markets and natural resource wealth, economic factors such as market
size and the skill-level of the workforce, and political factors like the
security situation or policy context in the host country. The study se-
lects political stability and the nature of the global economic context as
two key uncertainties that can be used to provide a skeleton for creat-
ing four distinct scenarios, that reflect futures characterized respective-
ly by an expanding global economy and a politically stable African
continent (l’Essor Africain), an expanding world economy and an un-
stable continent (The Lucky Few), a contracting global economy and
unstable continent (The Lost Continent), and a contracting global econ-
omy and stable continent (Weathering the Storm).
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Such scenarios might be used by policymakers to compare their own
views of how the future could unfold with the fictional storylines. This
type of comparison may encourage readers to think about what types of
occurrences might disrupt progress toward the “official future” that
they imagine. In addition, policymakers can focus on the positive and
negative developments identified in the scenarios and think about the
types of policy responses that might be necessary in order to bring
about favourable outcomes. Finally, policymakers can use the range of
scenarios to explore how well current strategies would fare in the var-
ied contexts the scenarios describe. These scenarios do not by them-
selves provide a clear roadmap for action, however. Indeed, they leave
policymakers with a great deal of room for interpretation.
3. Scenario Analysis and Global Development: Considerations for
Policymakers
This section offers several concluding points relating to considerations
that development policymakers should make in evaluating whether and
how scenario analysis methods should be integrated into their planning
portfolios. Scenario analysis methods were developed in corporate and
governmental settings in response to dissatisfaction with existing plan-
ning tools. Organizations interested in using scenario analysis to sup-
port long-term planning should first consider what factors have con-
tributed to the lack of capacity to anticipate emerging trends and long-
term challenges within the organization. In the development policy
context, the sub-optimal transmission of information from field-level
offices to headquarters may represent one cause of limited foresight;
another may be lacklustre investment in research on development is-
sues in general. Because scenario analysis can integrate knowledge
produced through a variety of channels, if an aid agency has a strong
research base to draw on, its scenario building efforts may also be more
robust.
As the first chapter of this study emphasized in particular, the integra-
tion of a diversity of perspectives in the scenario development process
is regarded as a key factor contributing to the success of scenario-build-
ing efforts. On the one hand, it is important that key officials within an
organization have ownership of the scenario process, so that they can
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directly benefit from the process itself rather than just the finished
product. On the other hand, involving other stakeholders, for example
individuals representing a variety of societal groups, can be beneficial
in collecting alternative viewpoints that may challenge conventional
wisdom within the organization.
Policymakers considering relying on scenario methods to enhance their
long-term planning also need to be careful in their selection of ques-
tions to frame their scenario analyses. If a scenario exercise is not suf-
ficiently thematically or geographically focused, it risks painting an
overly broad portrait of future developments which may not be well-
suited to informing the organization’s current strategy.
Finally, policymakers should be aware of basic resource constraints in
considering whether to apply scenario analysis methods. Scenario-
building can be time and resource-intensive, and since it ideally in-
volves a commitment on the part of key managers within an organiza-
tion, policymakers will need to determine how many organizational re-
sources they want to invest in a research process that does not neces-
sarily deliver neat actionable policy recommendations.
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1 Overview of scenario analysis methods
1.1 Introduction
This study provides an introduction to scenario analysis as a tool for sup-
porting development policy planning. This method, which represents one
prominent approach for studying what the future may bring, has been ap-
plied in a host of seemingly different domains, including security analysis,
corporate strategy, and environmental planning. Across these areas of
analysis, planners share the fundamental challenge of anticipating develop-
ments in a future that is uncertain.
Coping with uncertainty is a challenge common to many individuals and or-
ganizations and the governmental actors who will make decisions about the
future priorities of global development policy are no exception. The context
in which development policy is formulated and implemented is naturally
complex, given the diversity of governmental and private actors involved,
the range of social, economic, and political problems development policies
aim to address, and the wide variations in the nature of the local settings
where policy interventions are ultimately implemented. Adding to the un-
certainty generated by these features of the global development landscape
is the often long-term quality of development interventions. While devel-
opment assistance may produce results in the short-term, through the de-
livery of health care treatment or food assistance, for example, it may also
contribute to transformational processes that shape economic and political
opportunities over a longer time horizon. Development policies enacted in
the present will influence the quality of life of future generations, and imag-
ining the kind of world these future generations may inherit can be useful
in encouraging reflection on what types of policies can be devised to ad-
dress long-term challenges.
The present study forms part of an ongoing research project that aims to re-
flect on how the global development landscape may change in the coming
decades. As a starting point for the analysis of long-term changes in the de-
velopment arena, the first part of this study outlines the central characteris-
tics of scenario analysis, highlights the distinctiveness of the scenario ap-
proach from other forms of inquiry, and offers a general guide for building
scenarios. This discussion also reviews illustrations of how scenario meth-
ods have been used to grapple with themes such as the global security con-
text, the international business environment, and global environmental
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challenges that are also relevant in considering how the context of devel-
opment policy might change in the years ahead. In providing an overview
of this methodological approach, this study highlights its promise as well as
its limitations, and stresses those purposes for which scenario analysis ap-
pears to be most appropriate.
A second part of this study develops an original illustration of how scenario
methods can be applied to examine development policy questions. This
specific illustration focuses on the question of how foreign direct invest-
ment flows may change theAfrican development landscape toward the year
2030. It presents four narratives (L’Essor Africain, The Lucky Few, Weath-
ering the Storm, and The Lost Continent) that describe possible futures for
the African continent. These narratives are organized around two key di-
mensions of uncertainty that may influence investment trends. The first di-
mension of uncertainty deals with the question of how the state of the glob-
al economy will influence investment patterns and development outcomes
and the second area of uncertainty relates to the ability of African govern-
ments to maintain political stability both internally and across the region.
The justification of the selection of these drivers of change is discussed
alongside a presentation of general determinants of investment patterns pri-
or to the elaboration of the scenarios themselves. A third and final section
of the study outlines general considerations for policymakers potentially in-
terested in using scenario methods.
1.2 Scenario analysis: Definition and history
Used in its original sense, the term “scenario” refers to the outline of a the-
atrical plot, an imagined sequence of events that ties a story together. Sce-
nario analysts often take this conceptualization of a scenario as an imagined
narrative as a starting point. Thus Porter defines a scenario as “an internal-
ly consistent view of what the future might turn out to be” (1985, 446), while
Schoemaker characterizes scenarios as “focused descriptions of fundamen-
tally different futures presented in a script-like or narrative fashion” (1993,
195). In adopting the plural form, this definition highlights the emphasis that
scenario analysis places on the elaboration of multiple alternative futures
rather than focusing on a presentation of a single vision of the future.
The emphasis on a scenario as a narrative highlights that scenario building
requires more than a description of static future states. According to one in-
fluential definition, “scenarios are hypothetical sequences of events con-
Erik Lundsgaarde
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structed for the purpose of focussing attention on causal processes and de-
cision points” (Kahn / Wiener 1967, cited in Greeuw et al. 2000, 7). This
formulation underlines that understanding how a possible future may un-
fold is just as important as describing the potential end state. The notion of
a hypothetical future is also a concept of central importance running
through these definitions, since many scenario analysts would emphasize
that a scenario is not a prediction (van Notten 2006).
In the same way that scenario analysts often suggest that scenarios are not
intended to generate predictions about the future, they also underline the
distinction between forecasting and scenario analysis (van der Heijden
2005). A forecast is a projection of future trends based on observed regu-
larities in correlations between a given set of variables. While forecasters
may acknowledge the uncertainty of their predictions by estimating the
likelihood of a particular occurrence, scenario analysis aims to deal with
uncertainty by presenting a set of fundamentally different outcomes that are
generally accepted as equally plausible.
Although the use of scenarios for planning purposes has a long heritage, par-
ticularly in the area of military strategy, the approach gained momentum in
the early Cold War period. In the United States, scenario analysis emerged
as a tool to grapple with the uncertainties that accompanied the development
of new weapons technologies and heightened confrontation with an unfa-
miliar political system (Bradfield et al. 2005). Herman Kahn, a prominent
defence intellectual affiliated with the Rand Corporation, is often credited
with providing the foundation for the wider use of scenario techniques in the
United States in this period. Kahn’s work emphasized the need to “think
about the unthinkable”, or to develop perspectives on the nature of future
challenges that defied conventional thinking. For Kahn, the scenario ap-
proach offered a means to stimulate imagination, to uncover important
trends and anticipate potential crises, and to explore the implications of al-
ternative policy choices. Ultimately, the goal of the scenario enterprise was
to help policymakers make better decisions. To this end, Kahn founded the
public policy think tank the Hudson Institute in 1961 (Aligica 2004).
France represented another important centre for the development of sce-
nario techniques from the 1950s onward. As in the American case, the rise
of scenario analysis in France was driven by a desire to inform public pol-
icymaking. The scenario approach developed by Gaston Berger known as
La Prospective emphasized that political decisions needed to take the long-
Building long-term scenarios for development
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term consequences of policy choices into consideration (Masini 2006). The
prospective thinking advocated by Berger and other French futurists such
as Masse and de Jouvenel could be seen both as an attempt to provide a cor-
rective to existing forecasting techniques and as an effort to emphasize the
normative functions of scenario building (Bradfield et al. 2005). For these
thinkers, the imagination of preferred future states could serve to encourage
policymakers to make decisions that would move the country toward those
better futures. As leading French scenario planning expert Michel Godet
stresses, La Prospective seeks to combine the anticipation of possible or de-
sired changes (pre-activity) with pro-activity, action based on the assess-
ment of strategic options available given a set of possible or desired futures
(Godet / Roubelat 1996; Godet 2006).
While scenario methods enjoyed a first boom in the public policy arena,
scenario analysis became increasingly popular in corporate planning from
the 1970s onward. The development of scenario planning within Royal
Dutch Shell, one of the world’s largest corporations, contributed to the
heightened popularity of the method. The scenario techniques developed at
Shell responded to a demand within the company to move away from tra-
ditional planning practices that viewed the future business environment as
a likely continuation of existing trends.
Using Kahn’s method as a foundation, planners at Shell first generated ex-
ploratory scenarios that attempted to distinguish between uncertainties and
predetermined elements in the business environment. These scenario build-
ing efforts in the early 1970s examined potential changes in the nature of
supply and demand for oil and the possible effects of how energy markets
could be regulated. A more detailed analysis of the interests and behaviour
of key actors in response to changing conditions of oil availability led the
scenario planners at Shell to recognize that a major discontinuity in the na-
ture of the oil supply was possible in the decade ahead. While the scenario
team suggested that the oil disruption might come in 1975, the oil crisis of
1973 offered clear evidence that what might have appeared unthinkable
some years earlier had actually come to fruition (Wack 1985b). The appar-
ent success of the scenario approach in anticipating the oil shocks provided
a compelling reason for Shell’s management to continue to rely on scenario
planning to inform corporate strategy, and the company’s experiences re-
main a central point of reference in understanding what scenarios can ac-
complish and how they should be developed.
Erik Lundsgaarde
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1.3 Purposes of scenario analysis
Scenario analysis can serve numerous functions. As the discussion above
suggests, one of the key promises of the scenario approach has been to an-
ticipate uncertainties in an external environment that will influence how an
organization can accomplish its goals in the future. In this way, scenario
building serves a risk assessment and risk management function (Wack
1985a; Miller / Waller 2003). More generally, scenario analysis can provide
decision-making support. The presentation of alternative futures may en-
hance decision-making processes within organizations by challenging ex-
isting cognitive biases among decision makers and stimulating thinking
about the potential consequences of experimenting with untested policies
(Chermack 2004).
The identification of a range of possible futures can also serve to reflect on
how robust a particular strategy may be. For example, if the scenarios that
are generated point to a policy response that would be valuable across the
range of potential outcomes, this response might be considered to be safer
than a potential policy response that would be appropriate only in one sce-
nario of how the future could play out (Clemens 1995; Schwartz 1996). De-
cision makers can also evaluate how well their policies will perform in in-
dividual scenarios to test policy robustness. As van Notten (2006) suggests,
scenario analyses that perform these functions can be characterized as
“product-oriented”, since they aim to produce information about the driv-
ers of emerging trends and to test specific policy options.
Advocates of scenario methods also highlight a broader purpose of scenario
construction efforts: to prod individuals and organizations to re-examine
the assumptions that underlie their views of the world, and in so doing, to
increase their capacity to accommodate diverse perspectives and to gener-
ate new ideas (Shell International 2003). In this vein, Chermack (2007) de-
scribes scenario building as a process of disciplined imagination that suc-
ceeds when a target audience alters its mental map of the world.
The importance of broadening perspectives in the scenario enterprise stems
from a core belief that knowledge held by a single individual or expressed
in a single viewpoint is less complete and less reliable than knowledge that
is accumulated from multiple sources (Blasche 2006). If the inclusion of a
broad range of viewpoints may allow analysts to obtain a better picture of
reality, the expression of diverse perspectives can at the same time con-
Building long-term scenarios for development
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tribute to a heightened appreciation of common viewpoints and foster the
emergence of shared understandings about how the future may develop.
Scenario building may therefore contribute to consensus-building, particu-
larly when the process is designed in a participatory manner emphasizing
group dialogue as a stimulus for creating images of the future.
One scenario building process that is often cited as a prime example of the
dialogue-promoting function of scenario construction was the Mont Fleur
scenario exercise carried out in South Africa between 1991 and 1992. Dur-
ing the Mont Fleur process, 22 South African participants representing a
broad spectrum of societal and political groups worked together to formu-
late narratives about how the country could develop toward the year 2002.
Taking the contemporary South African context marked by economic and
social crises as a starting point, the participants developed four scenarios
that were organized around three central questions relating to the prospects
for a negotiated political settlement between the apartheid regime and anti-
apartheid political groups, the rapidity of a regime transition, and the sus-
tainability of government policies. One of the scenarios produced by this
group pointed to the prospect of a political settlement leading to participa-
tory democracy that could be achieved within a short period of time and
that would create a soft political and economic landing for the country (Ka-
hane 1992). While this scenario exercise did not outline concrete policy
proposals that would put the country on a path toward rapid and stable dem-
ocratic reform, the publication of the scenarios did sketch an optimistic path
out of crisis that fed into the political discourse of the transition period.
The idea generation and dialogue promoting goals of scenario analysis un-
derline that the approach often fulfils a basic exploratory function. In con-
structing the pathways that lead to alternative outcomes, however, scenario
analysts may also evaluate or create means of representing knowledge
about the world by drawing attention to questions of cause and effect and
by considering how central factors interact to produce a given outcome. As
Aligica (2007) suggests, a scenario can be likened to a thought experiment
that can examine the limitations of existing theoretical frameworks and pro-
pose new models for representing the relationships between central vari-
ables of interest. While other methods may aspire to do the same, the dis-
tinctiveness of the scenario approach lies in its commitment to accepting
multiple and potentially competing models as equally valid.
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1.4 Varieties of scenario analysis
The scenario approach accommodates multiple methods. A central distinc-
tion can be made between quantitative scenario methods that draw on for-
mal models to project the future and qualitative methods that hew more
closely to the definition of the scenario as narrative proposed earlier in this
study. Quantitative and qualitative scenario analysis approaches differ in
terms of the types of information they rely on to build scenarios, but share
a fundamentally similar view of the kind of knowledge that scenario con-
struction produces. This section first examines more formalized scenario
methods and then reviews the qualitative approaches that have developed
from the Shell scenario analysis tradition in particular.
1.4.1 Distinguishing trend extrapolation from scenarios
Before outlining key quantitative approaches to scenario analysis, it is use-
ful to briefly highlight the difference between scenarios and trend analysis
or trend extrapolation. Trend analysis offers a projection of the future based
on patterns observed from the past. These projected trends may be of a lin-
ear, exponential, or parabolic nature (which may for example reflect cycli-
cal patterns of change) and are generally based on a model that provides the
best fit to historical data (UNIDO s. a.). An example of a long-term projec-
tion based on a model incorporating assumptions taken from historical ex-
periences is the Goldman Sachs study on the future weight of Brazil, Rus-
sia, India, and China in the world economy (Wilson / Purushothaman
2003). Although the authors of this report acknowledge that their projec-
tions toward 2050 are laden with uncertainty and hint that there are factors
that could disrupt the progression of the trends they describe, they never-
theless present single projections for each of the countries they examine.
The orientation of trend extrapolation toward the past likely makes it diffi-
cult to identify potential discontinuities. However, trend extrapolations are
acknowledged to be useful in examining changes in the short-term and may
be more effective when available data stretch across a time period that is
much longer than the forecasting horizon (Duinker / Greig 2006).
While trend extrapolation generally results in the identification of a single
probable trend line, another form of trend analysis called trend impact
analysis identifies multiple potential trajectories and produces a result con-
sistent with the alternative futures generated in scenario analysis. Trend im-
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pact analysis shares a common point of departure with trend extrapolation,
in that the first step is to project a “surprise-free” trend line based on his-
torical data. The method then seeks to develop divergent projections
through the identification of factors or future events that could hamper the
progression of the existing trend (Bradfield et al. 2005). Trend impact
analysis may be especially useful when a researcher wants to evaluate the
potential range of effects that the variation in a single central variable of in-
terest may produce (Kosow / Gaßner 2008). This method has been used to
present a range of predictions on the progression of indicators including per
capita gross domestic product (GDP), infant mortality, and food availabili-
ty that are combined in the State of the Future Index prepared by the Mil-
lennium Project run by the World Federation of UN Associations (Gordon
2003c).
1.4.2 Quantitative scenario analysis methods
One key criticism of trend extrapolation is that by assuming that the future
will mirror the past, this approach neglects the dynamic interactions be-
tween central variables of interest that produce changes in the structures in
which these interactions take place. Scenario building on the basis of sys-
tems dynamics modelling has sought to address this deficiency in trend
analysis. Systems dynamics models have their foundation in the principle
that in order to offer projections about how the future will evolve, it is nec-
essary not only to identify a list of variables that are likely to influence the
outcome of interest but also to examine the way that the values of the vari-
ables themselves may change through time as a result of the influence of
their interaction with other variables constituting the entire system. The as-
sumption that such feedback effects are common and the assumption that
variables often have a non-linear relationship to one another suggests that
the evolution of the system would be difficult to understand without re-
course to formal statistical analysis (Größler 2006).
The influential publication Limits to Growth built scenarios on the basis of
a systems dynamics model. According to the authors of this work, the pur-
pose of the model they developed was “to understand the broad sweep of
the future – the possible modes, or behaviour patterns, through which the
human economy will interact with the carrying capacity of the planet over
the coming century” (Meadows et al. 2004, 137). This statement underlines
the study’s consistency with one of the basic aims of scenario analysis,
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namely to map the contours of potential developments rather than to offer
hard predictions about future occurrences. The World3 model that the au-
thors of Limits to Growth developed explored the relationships between de-
mographic changes, the evolution of capital stocks, and the use of non-re-
newable natural resources. The central claim of this work was that expo-
nential growth in population as well as in industrial production would even-
tually overtax the capacity of the world’s physical systems to provide inputs
for the continuation of these patterns. Without the enactment of policies that
would curb population growth and prevailing production and consumption
patterns, humanity would ultimately face the prospect of sharp economic
decline (Meadows et al. 2004).
The scenarios that Limits to Growth generated were based on a single mod-
el. Variations in potential outcomes were explored by manipulating the val-
ues of particular variables to reflect more optimistic or pessimistic projec-
tions. As an example, one alternative to the baseline scenario simulated the
world’s growth trajectory in the presence of double the estimate of avail-
able natural resources. While the experimentation with values of variables
included in a model may produce alternative futures that can serve as use-
ful tools for thinking about key issues, the fixed quality of the model itself
can invite criticisms similar to those raised with respect to trend extrapola-
tion. If the relationships between variables are predefined, the open-ended-
ness of such scenario exercises may naturally be limited.
Another prominent scenario analysis effort that is based on a systems dy-
namics model is the International Futures project led by Barry Hughes.1
This research initiative has developed a publicly available software pro-
gram that allows interested users to explore how the global system may
evolve through time horizons stretching as far into the future as 2100. The
platform permits users to select parameters and to include or exclude cate-
gories of drivers of change at will and therefore provides the user some
flexibility in creating scenarios that respond to their individual assessments
of how relationships between central variables in the model should be de-
fined and what types of drivers of change should be regarded as most im-
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portant (Hughes / Hillebrand 2006). Even with this flexibility, however, the
set of equations that underpin the model cannot be changed (Greeuw et al.
2000).
An advance of the International Futures project over the model presented
by the authors of Limits to Growth is its attempt to incorporate a more com-
prehensive set of drivers of global change into its baseline model. Along
with a host of other variables, production and consumption functions in a
range of economic sectors including industry and agriculture, demographic
factors, energy supplies and use, and features of the global political land-
scape including regime characteristics in individual countries form sub-sys-
tems that together influence the broader global system (Hughes / Hillebrand
2006). The inclusion of such a wide range of variables as well as the re-
liance on indicators used to describe conditions in individual countries can
pose a challenge for data collection. Though one stated advantage of sys-
tems dynamics models is that they can be run from a single base year and
do not require extensive time-series data (Greeuw et al. 2000), the resource
commitments and modelling skills needed to construct and manipulate
large datasets represent key constraints for carrying out quantitative sce-
nario analyses.
Hughes and Hillebrand (2006) underline that the scenarios generated with
the International Futures software program are fundamentally exploratory
in nature. They note that the program “is no crystal ball. Even with the best
of computer simulations, the future remains essentially unpredict-
able”(ibid., 5). As with other forms of scenario analysis, the exploratory
quality of the enterprise does not necessarily limit its potential utility to pol-
icymakers, however, and the International Futures software program has re-
cently served as an input to governmental initiatives to identify future chal-
lenges in the intelligence and environmental fields. The main emphasis of
the program’s current research efforts is directly relevant to the study of the
future of development policy, as the International Futures research team is
presently examining prospects for progress in human development over the
coming decades.2
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A final example of quantitative scenario analysis is the International Food
Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI) work exploring global food security
prospects toward the year 2050 (von Braun et al. 2005). The International
Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade
(IMPACT) that is at the heart of IFPRI’s scenario generation process is built
around supply and demand equations and produces images of the future
that are based on the manipulation of variables representing agricultural
productivity, population and income growth, and the level of investments
directed toward social sectors.
These scenarios are designed to reflect futures that emerge as a result of dif-
ferent policy responses to the challenge of food insecurity. Policy choices
are reflected in the simulations through the expected effects that they would
have on the central variables of interest. For instance, the increased priori-
tization on rural development as a development policy goal is expected to
lead to enhanced agricultural productivity in IFPRI’s “Progressive Policy
Actions” scenario; inattention to global agricultural development through
stalled international trade negotiations is expected to contribute to declin-
ing productivity in its ‘Policy Failure’ scenario. Hence, policy choices are
integrated only indirectly into the stories presented in the scenarios.
Like the other quantitative scenario exercises described above, IFPRI’s sce-
narios serve to illustrate what can happen if certain broad political priorities
are adopted, however they do not provide an evaluation of what the most
appropriate policies for achieving these goals would be. As an instrument
of policy planning support, scenario analyses with such a wide scope may
therefore leave policymakers with many unresolved questions. This discus-
sion underlines that the practical outcome of a scenario building process is
often to open a dialogue about necessary priorities rather than to propose a
detailed set of actionable recommendations. Such scenarios may be de-
scribed as demonstrative, highlighting how the general orientations
favoured by an organization can promote particular outcomes.
1.4.3 Quantitative techniques for assessing drivers
of change
Apart from the approaches that undertake scenario construction through
computer simulations, another set of quantitatively-oriented techniques has
been developed to estimate the impact of particular factors as drivers of fu-
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Factor A Factor B Factor C  Factor D Sum
 
Factor A 3 3 1 7
Factor B 0 3 2 5
Factor C 1 1 2 4
Factor D  3 3 1 7
Sum 4 7 7 5
ture changes through the attempt to assign a value to the impact that poten-
tial drivers have on one another. These techniques can be used as inputs to
scenario development projects, but they are not stand alone instruments for
scenario generation. One simple technique is known as Influence Analysis,
which arranges potential drivers of change in a matrix where the same driv-
ers are arrayed in the rows and columns. A representation of such a matrix
appears below.
The matrix allows the researcher to make an assessment on an ordinal scale
on how strongly each possible driver influences each of the others. The
sums in the final row and the final column of the matrix then indicate the
relative scale of the influence of various drivers. The above matrix sug-
gests, for example, that Factor A has a strong influence over Factors B and
C, but is not as strongly influenced by other factors as the remaining po-
tential drivers are.
More complex methods of cross-impact analysis similarly attempt to ex-
plore interaction effects between hypothesized drivers of change or the oc-
currence of specific events. In particular, this method seeks to evaluate the
probability of a hypothesis or event materializing given the occurrence of
another event under consideration (Godet / Durance 2007). In the version
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Figure 1.1: Influence matrix *)
*) The numbers reflect an ordinal scale from 0 to 3, with hypothetical values assigned
according to the following schema: 0=no influence,
1=limited influence, 2=moderate influence, 3=strong influence.
Source: This table reproduces a table appearing in Kosow and Gaßner (2008)
that draws on Blasche (2006)
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of this technique promoted by Godet, the estimation of probabilities of
events is conducted through subjective assessments made by experts via
surveys. One of Godet’s contributions to the field has been the development
of software (Smic-Prob-Expert) that can be used to compile and analyze
these expert opinions. Like other quantitative techniques, one disadvantage
of cross-impact analysis is its limited open-ended quality, since the prepa-
ration of a cross-impact matrix or a survey requires that factors for which
experts are expected to evaluate the likelihood of their occurrence be set in
advance (Gordon 2003a).
One final method that can incorporate quantitative analysis into the sce-
nario construction process is the Delphi Method. This method shares a re-
liance on expert opinion with cross-impact analysis. The distinctiveness of
the Delphi technique is its attempt to identify a general tendency in the ap-
praisal of the occurrence of particular events through multiple rounds of
surveys. The survey format allows experts to remain anonymous and pur-
portedly fosters the equal expression of views that might be lost in group
exchanges.
The multiple iterations are designed both to allow for feedback from the
survey organizers that nudge participants toward consensus and also to al-
low respondents to reassess their own responses over time (Gordon 2003b;
Landeta et al. 2008). Quantification through simple explorations of central
tendency can give the researcher an idea about the expected probability of
a given phenomenon materializing. While one emphasis of Delphi methods
is the generation of insights about when a particular phenomenon might oc-
cur, the technique can also be used to assess whether a particular course of
action is desirable or to identify specific policy measures that may be ap-
propriate to achieve desired outcomes (Gordon 2003b).
While a Delphi round may have the advantage of being able to collect opin-
ion without having to confront the logistical problem of assembling experts
in one location, other practical considerations may offset this perceived ad-
vantage of the technique. The requirement of multiple survey rounds natu-
rally prolongs the data collection process, and may also diminish the atten-
tiveness of the participants to the focus questions as the process unfolds.
Moreover, the survey format may limit the open-endedness of expert re-
sponses. A series of individual expert interviews may therefore provide a
good alternative to generating the information that the Delphi technique is
designed to produce. If the interviewer incorporates knowledge acquired
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through exchanges with early interviewees into subsequent interviews, the
interviewer may also be able to approximate the Delphi experience based
on the anonymous airing of expert opinion (Gordon 2003b).
1.4.4 Qualitative scenario analysis methods
The quantitative scenario techniques described above acknowledge the sub-
jective quality of the assessments they produce and do not claim to provide
hard predictions about how the future will unfold. These techniques can be
viewed as potentially complementary to qualitative approaches, and some
scenario building projects may integrate both quantitative and qualitative
elements.
An example of scenario work that combines qualitative and quantitative ap-
proaches is the research conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) to explore future patterns of carbon emissions. These
climate scenarios were built around alternative narratives that sought to ac-
count for the potential impact of factors including forms of governance,
patterns of economic activity, and technological change on the nature of
carbon use. The narratives served as a basis for models employing quanti-
tative indicators that were considered to reflect the central elements of these
storylines.3 Quantitative indicators may also serve as useful inputs for nar-
rative scenarios by offering descriptive information about existing trends or
by estimating the impact of particular drivers on the outcome of interest.
In the study of politics, qualitative research methods that emphasize the in-
depth study of individual cases and display sensitivity to time and place in
developing explanations for social phenomena have enjoyed a resurgence
in the last decade. This resurgence has been exemplified by the literature
expounding on the main elements of the process-tracing method, which
seeks to examine causal relationships between variables through the analy-
sis of historical documentation and interview research in particular (George/
Bennett 2005).
Characteristic elements of process-tracing include an attention to examin-
ing the sequence in which events unfold and the exploration of interaction
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effects, such as effects that relate to the way that the behaviour of political
actors is shaped by the institutional environment in which they operate. In
addition, proponents of process-tracing methods suggest that this form of
inquiry carries the further advantage of being able to generate new hy-
potheses, whereas methods relying on statistical analysis may emphasize
theory testing more exclusively.
Authors advocating qualitative approaches to scenario planning echo the
arguments that are made in favour of using qualitative methods in the so-
cial sciences. In his scenario analysis manual, for example, van der Heijden
(2005) highlights the process orientation of qualitative scenario analysis,
which enables a consideration of cause and effect through attention to se-
quencing. Ralston and Wilson indicate that because qualitative scenario
analysis “is not tied to computer algorithms…this approach is more likely
to generate the sort of lateral thinking that is needed to anticipate future
surprises and major inflection points” (2006, 9). Uninhibited by a formal
model, the qualitative approach may therefore leave open a process of dis-
covery. Mirroring arguments in favour of case-study analysis, Aligica un-
derlines that a key purpose of the detailed narratives that characterized
Kahn’s approach to scenario building was to provide a form of analysis that
allowed for “the comprehension of many interacting elements at once”
(2007, 295).
Qualitative scenario-building exercises can be described as either norma-
tive or exploratory in nature (Börjeson et al. 2006). Normative scenarios fo-
cus attention on questions related to “what should happen”, while ex-
ploratory scenario building exercises ponder questions about “what could
happen”. Clearly, even in an exploratory scenario building exercise that at-
tempts to assess how an organization might be affected by changes in its ex-
ternal environment, a normative element is still present, since the question
framing the scenario analysis is likely to be driven by the set of goals an or-
ganization hopes to achieve. The sections that follow briefly highlight key
aspects of normative and exploratory scenario exercises.
1.4.5 Normative scenarios
A scenario builder’s decision to adopt a more explicitly normative focus at
the outset of a scenario project can influence the choice among qualitative
scenario analysis procedures. If the purpose of a scenario exercise is to
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imagine a pathway toward a preferred future, scenario builders can adopt a
backcasting approach, where the starting point tends to be a visioning ex-
ercise that first outlines a goal to be achieved and then proceeds to map out
the types of transformative measures that need to be taken to move from the
present situation toward those desired goals (Carlsson-Kanayama et al.
2008). Backcasting, and normative narrative scenarios more generally, tend
to focus on exploring the pathway leading to a single desirable end goal, in
contrast to the emphasis placed on multiple futures in other forms of sce-
nario analysis (Gaßner / Steinmüller 2006).
The backcasting approach has been especially popular in examining ques-
tions of environmental sustainability, energy use, transportation, and urban
planning. As an example, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) conducted a backcasting study over the period be-
tween 1994 and 2000 that sought to identify how environmentally sustain-
able transport systems could be developed by 2030 (OECD 2002b). This
initiative began with a review of policies in the handful of countries used
for case studies and the selection of indicators that could be used to meas-
ure the achievement of an environmentally sustainable transport system.
Teams of experts working in the case countries then developed baseline
scenarios that reflected likely developments in the presence of “business as
usual”.
Through a process of structured brainstorming, experts then generated ideas
about how to move toward the desired sustainable future, orienting this
process around two main alternative emphases that could put countries on
the right pathway: technological improvements and restrictions in transport
use. For the OECD, the value of this type of exercise lay in its ability to mo-
tivate deliberate movement toward a more sustainable future by stressing
the distance between the pathways outlined in the business as usual scenar-
ios and the preferred scenarios (OECD 2002b). Backcasting may also pro-
vide a way of assessing the key challenges that could disrupt progress to-
ward desired futures.
While the backcasting approach may be useful in providing an impulse for
needed ruptures with existing practice, it also has some limitations. Börje-
son et al. (2006) note, for instance, that the priority attached to achieving a
long-term goal may lead to an emphasis on priorities that may be difficult
to implement in the short-term. Moreover, the focus on identifying a path-
way toward a single preferred goal may be problematic since the goals of
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interested actors as well as the menu of policy choices available to address
these goals may themselves evolve through time.
1.4.6 Exploratory scenarios: The intuitive logics method
The qualitative approach labelled “intuitive logics” occupies a central place
in the English language scenario analysis literature. It is also considered to
be the dominant scenario technique in use (Hives 2007). The intuitive log-
ics approach is associated with the scenario development work of Shell, the
California-based think tank SRI International, and the Global Business Net-
work, a California-based business consultancy. Its wide application may re-
flect the effective publicity that scenario analysts associated with these in-
stitutions have provided for the method. Several leading primers on sce-
nario analysis methods have been written by individuals with ties to Shell
(Wack 1985a; 1985b; Schoemaker 1993; van der Heijden 2005). Other sce-
nario analysis handbooks emphasizing this approach include a book written
by SRI analysts Ralston and Wilson (1998), and Peter Schwartz’s The Art
of the Long View. Schwartz, now the head of the Global Business Network,
previously worked for both SRI and Shell International.
The intuitive logics approach is exploratory in nature. At its core, the focus
of scenario development in this tradition is the identification of challenges
that may alter the environment in which an organization operates. In de-
scribing the external conditions that organizations will ultimately have to
react to, the approach is strongly oriented toward supporting decision-mak-
ing processes, and its practitioners view scenarios as instruments for re-
shaping perceptions held by decision makers, which can in turn better al-
low them to respond to forces of change that are mostly beyond their con-
trol (Wack 1985a). The strategic role of scenarios in this tradition is often
reflected in the use of the term “scenario planning”, which implies organi-
zational learning that translates into action.
As Ralston and Wilson explain, this approach “is ‘intuitive’ in the sense
that it builds on mental models, ‘soft’ inputs, and the hunches and assess-
ments of uncertainty by the scenario participants. But it is also logical, for-
mal, and disciplined in its use of ‘hard data’, analysis and a structured ap-
proach to the task” (200, 8–9). According to Aligica (2003), the tacit
knowledge that individuals carry around with them is a significant source
of insight about current and future trends, yet translating this background
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information or expertise into knowledge about the future likely requires a
structured process of idea exchange. The set of guidelines for conducting
scenario analysis that are laid out by practitioners of the intuitive logics
method provide a road map for using individual expertise to generate plau-
sible futures that can guide decision-making processes. These guidelines
are discussed in detail in the section that follows.
1.5 The scenario-building process: General overview
This section outlines the guidelines for the scenario building process that
have emerged in the literature on the intuitive logics model. There is some
variation among authors following this tradition in terms of the number of
steps in the scenario building process that they identify. Schwartz (1996) di-
vides the scenario construction process into 8 steps, Schoemaker (1993)
outlines 10 steps, and Ralston and Wilson (2006) break the process down
into 14 phases. In spite of these differences in emphasis, the roadmap for
scenario-building is broadly similar among these authors.
The differences in the number of steps that have been identified by these
authors suggest that the phases of the scenario process that are outlined be-
low are not necessarily discrete stages. While the discussion below is gen-
erally structured around the list of procedures produced by Schwartz and
reproduced in Box 1 below, the discussion also includes recommendations
from a wider variety of authors to reflect the central elements of best prac-
tice in scenario development.
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Box 1: Main steps in the scenario building process
Source: Schwartz (1996)
1. Identify the focal issue or decision
2. Identify the factors in the external environment shaping the issue or decision
3. Isolate the driving forces that influence the factors identified in stage 2
4. Evaluate the relative importance and uncertainty of the driving forces
5. Determine the scenario logics, select dimensions along which scenarios will
differ
6. Construct narratives around these dimensions
7. Assess implications of scenarios for focal issue or decision
8. Develop indicators to monitor whether a scenario is materializing
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Step 1: Problem definition
The process of scenario construction begins as any other research process
would, with the formulation of central research questions and the delimita-
tion of the scope of inquiry. If the goal of a scenario-building exercise is ul-
timately to inform decision-making processes within an organization, this
stage focuses on the identification of the questions that individuals within
the organization regard as critical in understanding how the organization
should respond to future change.
These types of critical questions will often be brought out in relation to the
discussion of the core competencies of an organization.At the earliest agen-
da-setting stage of a scenario project involving an organization, an impor-
tant part of the process is allowing members of the organization to freely
articulate their concerns about the future. Van der Heijden (2005) suggests
that this process can be carried out either through group brainstorming ses-
sions or through individual interviews, with interviews representing a
preferable technique due to the greater detail that they provide.
One element of determining the decision focus of the scenario exercise is
assessing the strategic versus tactical nature of the goals that are of central
interest to decision-makers. If the preoccupations of decision-makers are
primarily oriented toward short-term considerations, scenarios may be not
be very useful tools for decision support, since scenarios that would be de-
veloped would differ little from one another (Ralston / Wilson 2006).
The case for pursuing a scenario approach then often begins with the recog-
nition that central challenges facing the organization will play out over the
long-term. For example, the integration of scenario analysis techniques in-
to the corporate planning portfolios of major energy companies reflects the
fact that these companies undertake capital-intensive investments that re-
quire a substantial lead time. The construction of an offshore oil platform
requires a massive resource commitment, with the return on investment de-
pendent on the state of an international market many years in the future.
The selection of the time horizon for the scenario analysis is an important
element of this early stage of the scenario building process and should re-
flect the key issues and decisions on the organization’s agenda.
If a given scenario project aims to address an audience that is wider than
the particular organization that may fund the study or where the research is
carried out, an early stage of the scenario development process will also un-
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dertake to conduct a stakeholder analysis to assess what actors will be af-
fected by the decisions or issues that are brought into focus. Schoemaker
(1993) suggests, for instance, that stakeholder analysis should be conduct-
ed at an early stage not only to assess how particular actors may be affect-
ed by developments in a specific area, but also to understand how these ac-
tors will be able to influence unfolding events. The nature of the interests
of these actors as well as their power to influence conditions relevant to the
decision focus can be made explicit during this phase.
In their treatment of scenario methods, Ralston and Wilson (2006) propose
other steps that must be taken at the outset of the scenario process includ-
ing measures related to overall project design that will determine how a sce-
nario project is managed. For these authors, a typical scenario analysis proj-
ect usually involves planning for a series of multi-day workshops that will
engage up to a dozen individuals stretching across several months. The du-
ration of a scenario building exercise will depend on the scope of the re-
search question: global scenarios generally take a year or more to complete.
The scenario process can be managed by a team of researchers to ensure
that a diversity of competencies and viewpoints is reflected in the process
of elaborating the scenarios. Van der Heijden (2005) similarly emphasizes
the need to assemble a research team to accompany the scenario develop-
ment process, and notes the desirability of having a multidisciplinary team
that includes a variety of stakeholders and a mix of individuals with ex-
pertise to contribute and those who are able to offer novel perspectives on
the problems discussed.
Step 2: Analysis of the external environment
Once the research focus that backgrounds the scenario development
process has been narrowed down, analysts can move to a second phase of
data collection and analysis that seeks to assemble what is known about the
external environment relevant to the problem under consideration. This
stage may represent an initial exploratory or idea generation phase that be-
gins to isolate the factors that will be assessed in greater detail as the sce-
nario project unfolds.
As Ralston and Wilson (2006) suggest, information relevant to understand-
ing how a particular problem will evolve in the future will already exist in
the organizational setting where the scenario analyst is working, either in
the form of studies about specific topics or in the form of personal knowl-
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edge. Information gathering can as a result take the form either of literature
researches or interviewing. Idea generation workshops within an organiza-
tion may serve the same purpose. In the course of this information gather-
ing process, scenario analysts will need to focus on a manageable list of
topics to explore in further detail. At the same time that this stage unearths
relevant knowledge within an organization or related to a particular issue,
it also involves the identification of knowledge gaps that scenario builders
will need to fill in.
In Shoemaker’s (1993) summary of the scenario analysis process, the iden-
tification of current trends enters the picture during this early stage of sce-
nario development. The relevance of examining current and historical
trends as a foundation for scenario building is clear. On the one hand, pro-
ducing descriptively accurate pictures of the present can generate insights
about what underlying factors have contributed to these outcomes. On the
other hand, it is necessary to establish a common starting point for the sce-
narios that will describe alternative future development paths.
Steps 3 and 4: Identifying and assessing relevant drivers of change
A “driver of change” or “driving force” is a central concept in the scenario
analysis literature. The isolation of drivers of change follows from a broad
analysis that lists factors that could potentially influence the outcome of in-
terest. A driver is a central explanatory variable, a factor that is considered
to have a determining influence over the direction that the future will take.
Clearly, the concept is not exclusive to the scenario analysis literature, but
is relevant in other research contexts where explanation is a desired goal.
The British Department for International Development (DFID) has, for in-
stance, recently introduced a “drivers of change” approach to guide its
country-level development assistance programming.
As Warrener writes, DFID’s approach focuses on “understanding how
change occurs within specific contexts” and also reflects “the application
of political economy analysis to formulation of donor strategy and imple-
mentation” (2004, 1, emphasis in original). The DFID “drivers of change”
approach seeks to identify factors that shape development prospects that fit
into three main categories: structural factors that include historical, geo-
graphical, and demographic forces, institutional factors that principally re-
late to the rules that structure political and economic organization, and fac-
tors that focus on the qualities of economic and political actors.
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The drivers of change that DFID has proposed are similar to the range of
potential driving forces listed by Ralston / Wilson (2006). They outline a set
of categories of potential drivers to consider that includes demographic pat-
terns, social factors such as values and consumer preferences, general eco-
nomic conditions, factors relating to the nature of government and regula-
tion in a given context, technological forces, and international influences.
The phase of the scenario building process that focuses on the identification
of key influences on the outcome of interest also involves an assessment of
how the variety of factors relate to one another, with the prioritization of
particular forces over others as an ultimate goal. As noted above, such an
analysis may be aided by the techniques of influence analysis (see Kosow/
Gaßner 2008), or through the construction of a visual influence diagram
that maps out the direction and quality of the influence of particular vari-
ables on others being considered (van der Heijden 2005). In the intuitive
logics school, the process of identifying and weighing the importance of
driving forces is ultimately a subjective matter, but this process often draws
on expert opinion and deliberation on prioritization in a group setting.
Many scenario analysts emphasize that it is important at this stage to not
only assess the relative importance of driving forces, but also to isolate
which factors seem to be surrounded by the highest degree of uncertainty.
According to Porter (1985), it is useful for a scenario analyst to distinguish
between three key types of variables that affect the outcome being ana-
lyzed. These categories relate to whether factors can be considered to be
constant, predetermined, or uncertain.
Constant factors are those that are unlikely to change at all, while predeter-
mined factors can change, but are likely to change in predictable ways. Un-
certain factors are characterized by a lack of clarity about the direction in
which they will evolve in the future. As Porter (1985) argues, it may be use-
ful at this stage to attempt to distinguish between independent uncertainties,
elements of the external environment that do not seem to be influenced by
other uncertainties, and dependent uncertainties, factors that display uncer-
tainty because they are influenced by the independent uncertainties.
The separation of uncertain factors from predetermined and constant fac-
tors is a central element of the scenario approach. In Kahn’s early work on
the scenario method, certain types of variables were considered to be more
generally stable than others. Geographical, cultural, and institutional fac-
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tors were understood to be relatively fixed, while demographic factors were
likely to change only slowly. War, natural disasters, and international vari-
ables were considered to be larger unknowns (Aligica 2004).
In the course of preparing a list of drivers of change, scenario builders are
encouraged to focus on the factors that can be characterized as both impor-
tant and uncertain (Mercer 1995). On the one hand, scenario analysts
should strive to isolate which drivers should have the strongest influence
over the outcome of interest. On the other, they need to focus attention on
the factors that are the least predictable, since the identification of such fac-
tors will enable the scenario builder to develop scenarios that display a wide
range of variation. Scenario analysts may find it helpful to create a basic
table that maps driving forces according to the degree of uncertainty on one
dimension from low to medium to high and the level of impact (low, medi-
um, or high) on the other at this stage (Wilson 1998).
Step 5: Determining scenario logics
As Schwartz (1996) emphasizes, the selection of too many drivers and the
identification of too many elements of uncertainty can make a scenario
building process unwieldy, hence it is necessary that the scenario builder
limit the choice of key dimensions of uncertainty in order to produce pic-
tures of the future that provide their intended audience with a clear sense of
the scope of possible outcomes. One tool for ensuring that the scenarios are
both reflective of central elements of variation and easily presentable is the
development of a scenario matrix.
A scenario matrix has the same function as a two-by-two table that indi-
cates that the important variation in outcomes can be summarized by draw-
ing attention to the variation through time of two key variables of interest.
In Figure 2 below, the axes of a standard representation of a scenario ma-
trix are identified with the labels D1 and D2, reflecting the two drivers of
change that have been identified as the most important and most uncertain.
The ends of each axis represent extreme values of the central drivers. As the
figure suggests, the construction of such a matrix allows a researcher to out-
line four basic scenarios that can easily be distinguished from one another.
A classical example of a scenario axis is the one presented byWack (1985b)
that was developed in the period when Shell France first began to use sce-
nario analysis techniques. The scenario team identified uncertainties in the
business environment of the energy provider that related on the one hand to
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the nature of the regulatory climate that energy companies would be sub-
ject to and on the other hand to the nature of competition in the energy mar-
ket from alternative energy sources, namely natural gas. Hence, a scenario
matrix could be plotted where one dimension represented the extremes
from low to high availability of natural gas and another reflected a contin-
uum going from a continuation of the dirigisme characteristic of French
regulatory policy at the time to the liberalization that would likely be
favoured to bring France in line with the regulatory approach of the Euro-
pean Community.
A scenario exercise carried out in connection with the European Develop-
ment Cooperation (EDC) to 2010 research program provides another ex-
ample of the types of variables that can be juxtaposed on the axes of a sce-
nario matrix. Addressing the question of how EU development policy could
evolve in the future, the EDC 2010 researchers identified one axis of un-
certainty that reflected whether EU member states and the Commission
would move in the direction of more or less coherence and coordination in
their own policy choices and a second axis that related to the degree to
which European actors would adopt a stronger or weaker poverty reduction
focus in the future (Maxwell / Engel et al. 2003).
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Figure 1.2: The scenario matrix
Scenario A Scenario B 
Scenario D Scenario C 
D1  
D2 
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The construction of a scenario matrix, like the selection of the driving
forces that provide the basic foundation for the scenario logics, may draw
on a deductive process guided by theory. As Nordfors (2006) indicates, for
example, prominent theories of international relations, while often positing
that world politics will evolve in a particular direction, can serve as a basis
for outlining a continuum along axes in a scenario matrix. From the glob-
alization literature one could for example suggest that one axis for under-
standing future developments in world politics could be bounded at one end
by a situation where nation-states maintain dominance in the management
of economic relations and at the other by a logic where private actors and
market forces are dominant.
In a recent paper considering the role that large developing countries might
play in reshaping international relations toward the year 2030, Phillips
(2008) also provides an example of how theory can offer a basis for devel-
oping alternative visions of the future. Though the paper focuses on a sin-
gle possible future and does not invoke a scenario matrix, multiple possible
futures of international relations can be contemplated on the basis of the
key variables that Phillips’s analysis highlights.
Phillips indicates that two main forces that may shape how the future of in-
ternational relations could evolve relate to the nature of the distribution of
power in the international system on the one hand and the nature of inter-
dependence and cooperation among states on the other. These are classical
preoccupations in international relations theory, and can be used as a basis
for a scenario matrix. While Phillips emphasizes the possible future char-
acterized by a non-conflictual multipolar order, where international institu-
tions and substantial economic ties offset the potential for instability and
conflict owing to the rise of new power centres in the international system,
the possibility of a conflictual multipolar order where institutional institu-
tions are weaker is also implied by this analysis.
As Schwartz and Ogilvy (1998) note, an alternative to determining scenario
logics with the aid of a scenario matrix is to arrive at possible scenario plots
through what they label an inductive process. One variant of this alternative
approach involves thinking about “significant events” in the future and then
developing a storyline that identifies the chain of events that would produce
these outcomes.
Another variant takes as its starting point the elaboration of “the official fu-
ture” of the scenario user, which reflects a standard view within an organi-
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zation about how the future will unfold. Schwartz and Ogilvy characterize
the official future as “an unsurprising and relatively nonthreatening sce-
nario, featuring no discontinuous changes to current trends, no crises, and
continued stable growth” (1998, 62). The consideration of what forces un-
derlie a continuation of the status quo might serve as a basis for developing
scenarios that are fundamentally different, as scenario builders can then
consider how the future would unfold if the driving forces evolve in a di-
rection other than the one expected in the “official future”.
Step 6: Constructing narratives
The matrix approach is also advantageous because it effectively establish-
es a limit for how many scenarios can be generated. It provides a founda-
tion for constructing four scenarios that in van der Heijden’s view are “as
different from each other as possible within the limits of credibility to the
scenario user” (2005, 247). Wack (1985a) cautions against developing
more than four scenarios if the goal of the scenario building enterprise is to
inform decision making, suggesting that three scenarios are ideal. Depart-
ing from the logic of the matrix, these three scenarios could include one
“surprise-free” scenario and two others that reflect fundamentally different
pictures of how critical uncertainties could play out. Ralston and Wilson
(2006) favour four over three, noting that with three scenarios there may be
a tendency to see the middle route as the most probable future, where the
alternative futures concept generally seeks to present all scenarios as equal-
ly plausible.
At this stage of the scenario building process, the emphasis turns to flesh-
ing out storylines that will trace the development of a particular phenome-
non from the near future to a more distant time horizon. Whether a scenario
builder or a scenario team has used a scenario matrix to frame a scenario
plot or taken the “official future” as the baseline for developing scenario
logics, the previous step leaves unfinished the narrative that makes a sce-
nario more than just a static snapshot of an alternative future. Nordfors
(2006) underlines the analytical value of a narrative by referencing its cen-
tral place in the field of History. Nordfors writes that: “the narrative is an
extremely efficient way of creating insight into complex matters and
processes. You seldom have to tell the whole story in order to gain an un-
derstanding: a good narrative is open-ended and new snippets of informa-
tion can easily be inserted into the plot as they surface” (2006, 312).
Erik Lundsgaarde
32 German Development Institute
DI08-0985 Studie 40:Layout 1  16.12.2008  14:16 Uhr  Seite 32
The process of constructing narratives ultimately requires a good deal of
creativity, but the scenario analysis literature also provides some general
guidelines about considerations scenario builders need to make in order to
be convincing storytellers. Van der Heijden stresses the importance of an-
choring a narrative in the past and ensuring that it can be “appreciated as
one whole rather than as disconnected parts” (2005, 258). Alternative nar-
ratives produced in the scenario building process have a common starting
point in what is already known about the context being described. Due to
this common starting point, scenario builders should avoid introducing fun-
damental differences in the narratives in the earliest time period of the ac-
count of future events. Paying attention to the contextual backdrop for a
narrative can serve not only to make storylines more believable but can al-
so focus attention on interaction effects between key drivers of change and
other factors.
Even as the alternative narratives are designed to illustrate divergent tra-
jectories of how a particular phenomenon may develop through time, Ral-
ston and Wilson (2006) emphasize that there will also be commonalities
across the scenarios that relate to the presence of the constant or predeter-
mined elements that have been discussed above, and these commonalities
should ideally be incorporated into the narratives.
Ralston and Wilson also highlight the utility of introducing change agents
into the plot lines and writing stories in the present tense. While scenarios
themselves are understood to be hypothetical futures, removing uncertain-
ty in the author’s voice can aid the scenario user in accepting the possibili-
ty that each alternative will materialize. Finally, these narratives can be pro-
duced in various forms. Scenario authors may choose to present a retro-
spective account of how a given future came to pass from the standpoint of
an observer commenting on these developments at the end of the time hori-
zon under consideration. Such an account may for example take the form
of a speech delivered by a political figure or a media report.
One challenge that a scenario builder is likely to face in the narrative writ-
ing process is to determine what level of detail to convey. On this point,
Shell’s scenario experts underline that scenario builders “need to make sure
that the scenarios raise issues that are relevant to their recipients and chal-
lenge them to think about the future in a constructive and helpful fashion.
But this does not mean that they must provide very detailed descriptions of
events and their timing. Indeed, such precise details can seem misleading-
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ly like predictions” (Shell International 2003, 56). While a narrative paint-
ed too broadly may invite scepticism about the substance of the scenario
building exercise, too refined a treatment of how the future will unfold risks
restricting the space for interpretation for the end user of a scenario exer-
cise, so a scenario builder must find a middle ground between these ex-
tremes in assembling the narrative.
Steps 7 and 8: Evaluating the implications of scenarios and monitoring
The final component of the intuitive logics method is to feed the scenarios
back into decision-making processes within an organization to evaluate
what improvements in strategy might be suggested by the alternative fu-
tures presented. As Wilson (1998) indicates, decision makers can assess the
implications of scenarios for the organizations in multiple ways. One alter-
native is to examine scenarios individually in terms of the opportunities and
threats that they present for the organization and to consider the extent to
which the organization is prepared to deal with these threats.
A second means of feeding scenarios back into the decision-making process
is to examine the organization’s current strategy and evaluate how well it
performs in the different contexts that the scenarios describe. This approach
encourages reflection on the adaptability of an existing strategy to chang-
ing circumstances. Alternatively, scenario users might consider whether al-
ternative strategies exist that would better be able to help the organization
deal with challenges identified through the evaluation of the flexibility of
existing approaches. This stage of the scenario process can be likened to
“rehearsing the future”, where decision makers can explore how they would
need to react in a variety of circumstances. This step may therefore promote
organizational learning (Ralston / Wilson 1998).
Another variant on using scenarios to deliberate on organizational priorities
would be for an organization to orient strategy by focusing on the possible
developments identified in the scenarios that the organization may be espe-
cially interested in working toward or on the negative developments that
the organization should work to avoid.
Apart from deliberating on the appropriateness of particular strategies giv-
en alternative possible futures, scenario users may at this end stage also de-
velop measures that would indicate whether a given scenario seems to be
playing out or not so that decisions that are informed by a scenario exercise
can be re-evaluated in light of unfolding developments (Schwartz 1996). It
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is important to note that these final steps that are referenced in the intuitive
logics literature relate to scenario analysis that is conducted with an explic-
it planning orientation. Scenario building by itself does not produce strate-
gic recommendations, while scenario planning implies a process of inte-
grating the results of a scenario building exercise into deliberations on or-
ganizational strategy.
1.6 Evaluation of scenario methods
While the literature referenced above provides a good roadmap for carrying
out a scenario analysis project, this literature provides little information that
demonstrates how the application of scenario methods has helped organi-
zations to anticipate challenges and better adapt to a changing context. The
incorporation of scenario analysis techniques into the planning portfolios of
many corporations provides an indication that scenario methods are con-
sidered to be effective at accomplishing their goals, yet as Chermack (2007)
suggests, general appraisals of the utility of scenario methods have been
limited. He notes that “scenario planning has been in use for several
decades yet there is little empirical research to refute, support, or explain
the effectiveness of the process” (2007, 2). In a document produced in con-
junction with a recent review of methods of scenario analysis in use in
Africa, scenario builders from Oxford’s James Madison Institute and the
World Economic Forum present a similar criticism of the state of the field.
They note that:
“scenario practice is generally a fuzzy field, characterized, on the
one hand, by persistence, and recently renewed popularity, and on
the other hand by methodological confusion and a lack of well-
grounded theory. Despite the increasing wealth in scenario prac-
tice, there is a poverty of understanding about what works for what
purpose, when and why – and when/why not”(Wilkinson et al.
2008).
One seeming exception to the overall lack of assessment of the perform-
ance of scenario methods is a synthesis study prepared for the European En-
vironmental Agency by Greeuw et al. (2000) that evaluated 40 scenario ex-
ercises relevant to European environmental policymaking. These authors
also underlined several points of weakness in how scenario methods have
generally been applied, noting that common scenario analysis shortcomings
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have included the inadequate differentiation among scenarios, the limited
integration of unexpected occurrences into storylines, and the presentation
of overly vague policy recommendations. In addition, Greeuw et al. suggest
that many scenario analyses have not sufficiently allowed for the inclusion
of multiple perspectives.
Even strong proponents of the scenario method acknowledge that the ef-
fectiveness of scenario techniques in contributing to innovative thinking
may be dependent on the disposition of the decision makers that are the po-
tential end users of a given effort at scenario analysis. Using Shell’s im-
proved understanding of the evolving world oil market in the 1970s as an
example, van der Heijden remarks that: “the criterion for success of such a
scenario-based planning activity is not the insight alone, but whether this
was internalized sufficiently in the organization through an appropriate
scenario process, such that it led to action in response to the new percep-
tion” (2005, 140). Yet if scenario techniques only work well in the presence
of decision makers who display openness to incorporating insights gained
from a scenario exercise, this raises a question about whether such success
is simply reflective of a pre-existing disposition to incorporate innovating
thinking into organizational strategy rather than unique contributions of
scenario methods in their own right.
The difficulty in assessing the utility of scenario approaches may stem part-
ly from the limited truth claims they propose, which distinguishes scenario
techniques from positivistic methods of analysis that place greater empha-
sis on proving or disproving theoretical claims. Indeed, the goals that sce-
nario analysis aims to achieve may be somewhat modest. Scenario building
success might be measured by the degree to which a given set of scenarios
opens a dialogue about future priorities for an organization rather than by
the nature and long-term effectiveness of the strategy that emerges from a
scenario process itself. This paper has already stressed that many scenario
practitioners are aware of the limitations of scenario methods. Attempting
to paint pictures of what the future could look like is a fundamentally dif-
ferent exercise than delivering a clear prognosis of what will happen, and
scenario analysts recognize that uncertainty remains even when multiple
futures are mapped out.
While it may be difficult to determine whether scenarios have had intend-
ed effects of generating dialogue and providing an impetus for the discov-
ery of innovative solutions to future challenges, scenarios that are generat-
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ed can be assessed on their own merits by evaluation criteria that are simi-
lar to those used to evaluate other types of research. As Kosow and Gaßner
(2008) note, scenarios can be judged by measures of plausibility, consis-
tency, traceability and transparency, and the extent to which they present
differentiated visions of the future.
This list of criteria invites another comparison between theory construction
and scenario building. Internal and external consistency, respectively refer-
ring to the absence of contradictory elements and coherence with theoreti-
cal work in similar areas of inquiry, are considered to be desirable qualities
for theories as well (Bunge 1998). The transparency criterion highlights the
importance of outlining how data are collected and analysed, so that even
if the reproducibility of the findings is not desired, external observers can
still judge the validity of the findings by evaluating the process through
which findings are produced. The goal of transparency in the research
process is by no means unique to scenario methods; it is a desideratum
across varied research approaches.
1.7 Examples of scenario-building exercises
The following section provides an overview of studies that have incorpo-
rated scenario analysis methods in order to further evaluate standard prac-
tice in the field of scenario development. It pays particular attention to stud-
ies that can inform the project examining how the global development land-
scape could change toward the year 2030. The studies referenced below
have been selected primarily due to their thematic emphases, which relate
broadly to the global security context, the future of the global economy, and
the future of the global environment. At the end of this section, applications
of scenario analysis in the field of development policy will also be outlined.
In outlining these examples of scenario analysis in practice, attention will
be given to the methods employed and the purposes for which these re-
search projects were carried out.
1.7.1 Scenarios and security analysis
The application of scenario techniques in the area of defence planning fol-
lows from the general risk assessment and risk management benefits that
scenarios can provide. Military forces are complex organizations that re-
quire a long lead time to reform their personnel structures and to develop
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and integrate new material capabilities into their operations. Scenario
analysis has been integrated into the planning portfolios of defence agen-
cies and the research institutions that support them in order to provide clues
about how the global context they will have to confront in the future could
evolve.
One example of the use of scenarios in security planning comes from the
United States Air Force, which as part of broader reflections on the need to
understand how to transform the US military in the post-Cold War era un-
dertook an exercise called “Air Force 2025” that was launched in 1994. The
goal of this project was to think about how the US Air Force could main-
tain its international dominance given the potential for manifold changes in
the international system and within the United States (Engelbrecht et al.
1996).
The starting point for the Air Force 2025 scenario exercise was background
research consisting of familiarization with scientific studies in areas rele-
vant to the research focus and existing work by futurists on the subject as
well as basic exploration of a broad range of current trends, including pro-
jected developments in technology, medicine, international relations, and
economic and environmental change. From this initial assessment, the re-
searchers moved on to an analysis of key drivers of change.
The selection of drivers took place through a multi-stage process involving
some 225 participants. These participants were initially divided into 14 dif-
ferent groups where potential drivers were generated with the aid of multi-
ple techniques including topical research, expert interviewing, and brain-
storming. The list of 100 possible drivers that emerged from this stage was
then narrowed down through a second stage of discussion among represen-
tatives from each of the initial research groups, eventually focusing on three
key drivers of change related to 1) the character of the US world view, 2)
the nature of technological diffusion, and 3) the nature of the distribution of
power in the international system (Engelbrecht et al. 1996). The central
place of group deliberations in focusing attention on key drivers is consis-
tent with the social orientation of many scenario exercises.
The emphasis on three key drivers of change provides a slight variation on
the scenario matrix approach described in the presentation of the scenario
construction above. By mapping out the range of the selected drivers, the
Air Force researchers produced a three-dimensional scenario matrix, which
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they labelled the “strategic planning space”. One side of this box repre-
sented a continuum between a domestically and globally-oriented US
worldview, another represented a continuum between a slowly evolving
versus an exponentially changing technological context, and the third di-
mension reflected a continuum between concentrated and fragmented pow-
er in the international system. The combinations of these dimensions repre-
sented in the corners of the box provided a general outline for the main al-
ternative futures that would be developed, and the research project pro-
ceeded to fill in story lines leading to these possible futures through the
construction of “plausible histories”. Plausible histories tie together a series
of hypothetical events in order to make the postulated future believable
(Engelbrecht et al. 1996). The storylines developed therefore have a retro-
spective quality anchored in a description of a hypothesized end state.
The report summarizing this scenario development project suggested that a
primary contribution of the study was to provide a hypothetical testing
ground for the introduction of new strategies. The reports’ authors noted
that: “any set of systems, concepts, or technologies being considered by the
US for security purposes can be evaluated for utility relative to the six al-
ternative futures presented” (Engelbrecht et al. 1996, 113). This point
stresses that a completed scenario development project is often designed as
a tool for further reflection and analysis rather than as a closed initiative
that generates a list of precise recommendations for decision makers.
A more recent application of scenario techniques in the field of security
analysis was carried out under the aegis of the National Intelligence Coun-
cil (NIC) in the United States, a body designed to generate research to in-
form long-term strategic thinking in the American intelligence community.
The research conducted by NIC had an exploratory emphasis and sought to
identify future opportunities and challenges that might suggest the need for
policy action by analysing how the global context could evolve toward the
year 2020. The NIC 2020 project served as an extension of two research
projects (Global Trends 2010 and Global Trends 2015) which sought to
map out emerging trends and to identify key drivers of change, and could
be distinguished from these earlier forward-looking studies by its increased
focus on scenario building (National Intelligence Council 2004).
As the broad nature of the project’s guiding research question suggests, the
scope of the research effort was wide-ranging. Although the summary re-
port of the project does not outline the methods employed in great detail,
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the report’s authors indicate that a combination of trend analysis and sce-
nario building was used to create the finished product.4 A central feature of
the research process was its highly participatory orientation. In the course
of a year, more than 1000 individuals contributed to the project.5 This wide
participation was facilitated by the organization of numerous workshops
and conferences in both Washington and across the world. These work-
shops and conferences were aimed at collecting a diversity of viewpoints
about topics more focused than the global question orienting the study, in-
cluding the politics of identity, biotechnology, and climate change. In addi-
tion, they were designed to collect perspectives from a variety of world re-
gions in order to be able to better integrate insights about the challenges that
emanate from these regions and to better understand how the United States
was perceived abroad. The airing of expert opinion played a central role in
the data collection process.
Rather than developing a set of scenarios around two or three key dimen-
sions of uncertainty, the NIC project generated illustrative scenarios by fo-
cusing on the consequences of the progression of individual trends that pro-
vided the key scenario logics. One scenario emphasized the consequences
of the continued progression of economic growth and Asian economic dy-
namism, while a second focused on the continued political dominance of
the United States in a changing global power structure. The third scenario
suggested a world where radical Islam experienced growth in regions dis-
affected by globalization processes in particular. A final scenario empha-
sized the prospects for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction giv-
en the spread of communications technology (National Intelligence Coun-
cil 2004).
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A problematic feature of these scenarios is that because the reports’ authors
are not careful to distinguish the dimensions along which the scenarios will
differ, it is unclear whether each of these images of the future is really struc-
turally different from the others or whether they instead reflect different as-
pects of a fundamentally similar future. In terms of research output, the dis-
cussions of individual trends and the presentation of the results of the ex-
pert dialogues are likely more valuable than the individual scenarios. Over-
simplified scenarios that reflect one dimension of global change may have
a hard time delivering on the promise that scenarios will bring the attention
to complex interaction effects and unpacking causal relationships that they
are often lauded for. The potential for oversimplification may be especially
great when scenario exercises aim to have a global scope.
These two illustrative examples of applications of scenario analysis to in-
ternational security issues differ in their level of formalization, with the Air
Force study presenting a more transparent account of how its scenarios
were actually produced. Yet the NIC study makes the incorporation of di-
vergent viewpoints a more explicit goal in comparison. Both studies under-
line that collective efforts are often a critical component of scenario work,
whether such collaboration comes from individuals within the organization
or through cooperation with partner institutions and external experts.
1.7.2 Scenario building and the future of the world economy
Scenario methods have been widely applied by corporations seeking to bet-
ter understand how their business environments may evolve. While the sce-
narios developed within corporations often have an industry-specific focus
– Porter (1985), for example, provides an illustration of the use of scenario
techniques to assess the future competitive environment for chain saw pro-
ducers – for corporations with multidimensional business operations, com-
plex production processes, and markets that transcend national borders,
scenario projects that paint a picture of broad trends in the global economy
may be a useful tool for evaluating their global business strategies. This
section highlights two main types of scenario building endeavours that fo-
cus on how the international economic context will evolve: those that cast
a wide net to look at the evolution of forces in the global economy as a
whole and those that adopt a regional focus to explore the dynamics of
change in the world’s major economic power centres.
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An obvious reference point for scenarios that are global in scope and that
have an economic focus are the global scenarios that Shell has generated.
Shell undertakes a global scenario building project once every three years
to assist its management in assessing risks and opportunities in the global
business environment (Shell International 2003). The scenario development
process is lengthy. According to a guide to scenario development published
by Shell International (2003), its 2001 global scenarios emerged after more
than a year of research and focused scenario building workshops. Contrib-
utors to the scenario development process included a 15 member core team,
15 additional team members that acted as liaisons with key business divi-
sions, and some 200 specialists that made topical contributions on a short-
term basis.
The scenario development process within Shell progresses from an initial
stage of information gathering and interviewing within the organization to
identify central areas of concern and research gaps to an orientation work-
shop designed to synthesize the material collected in the initial phase and
to outline key uncertainties emerging from existing data collection efforts.
A multi-day scenario building workshop that produces sketches of central
scenario logics follows, and this workshop is succeeded in turn by an “af-
firmation workshop”, the goal of which is for the scenario team to critical-
ly review polished narratives according to criteria of plausibility, relevance,
and internal consistency.
The institutionalization of scenario building as a planning tool within Shell
means that each scenario exercise builds on previous organizational expe-
riences. As the years go by, the general scenario logics that have been pro-
duced in earlier rounds of scenario development can inform the frameworks
that guide subsequent global scenario projects. Summaries of Shell’s glob-
al scenario initiatives from 1992 onward are available online and make it
possible to trace revisions to scenario logics in fresh scenario building
work.6
The 1992 global scenario project took as its frame of reference a contem-
porary trend toward growing political and economic liberalization around
Erik Lundsgaarde
42 German Development Institute
6 Shell’s global scenarios can be found at the following web address:
http://www.shell.com/home/content/aboutshell/our_strategy/shell_global_scenarios/
previous_scenarios/previous_scenarios_30102006.html.
DI08-0985 Studie 40:Layout 1  16.12.2008  14:16 Uhr  Seite 42
the world and produced two alternative pictures of how the world would de-
velop toward the year 2020. One possible future, described in the scenario
labelled “New Frontiers” was characterized by the widespread embrace of
globalization processes, which would lead to a redistribution of wealth in
favour of poorer countries and a restructuring of the global division of
labour. The scenario also posits that in response to mounting environmen-
tal challenges produced by sustained global economic growth, states re-
spond by getting involved in more multilateral initiatives. If this first sce-
nario might be considered to be an expression of pro-globalization dis-
course, the second scenario suggests that the consequences of initial move-
ment toward greater global liberalization may actually be negative. In this
scenario, labelled “Barricades,” resistance to globalization processes leads
to a reinforcement of cultural identities and a determination to preserve na-
tional systems of economic organization. The world as a whole is charac-
terized by deeper divisions among countries and rising conflict (Shell In-
ternational 1993).
One of the questions this first Shell scenario example raises is the contri-
bution that theory might be able to make to scenario development, since the
alternative futures presented in the 1992 global scenarios reflect differing
outcomes related to central theoretical preoccupations in the field of Inter-
national Political Economy. These questions include the consideration of
how national autonomy can be maintained in the face of market integration
and what the distributional implications of changing economic conditions
might be.
The 1995 iteration of Shell’s global scenarios project adopted a stronger po-
sition on the dominance of liberalization as a force shaping the world econ-
omy. The scenarios in this round were based on the claim that global actors
had recognized that “There Is NoAlternative” (TINA) to globalization. The
alternative futures were then distinguished by how actors would harness
globalization processes to their benefit.
One scenario postulated a dominant model of societies with flexible regu-
latory systems giving precedence to private actors in managing economic
affairs, while an alternative scenario identified leading beneficiaries of
globalization as societies where social cohesion attributable both to gov-
ernment intervention designed to steer the economy and society in the right
direction and the presence of informal social networks generate efficient
economic outcomes (Shell International 1996). One might question
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whether these scenarios offer an expanded mental map of the world or
whether they instead recapitulate commonly held beliefs in the contempo-
rary context in which they were created, since the alternative views might
be considered to correspond to the American model of economic manage-
ment on the one hand and an Asian model on the other. Similar themes re-
lating to the relationships between social cohesion, market efficiency, and
regulation, and the nature of the relationships between different types of po-
litical and economic actors have also been emphasized in Shell’s more re-
cent global scenarios (Shell International 2002; 2005).
This discussion of the central orienting frameworks of Shell’s global sce-
narios glosses over the detailed research process that contributes to the
preparation of simplified summary narratives. To craft a compelling global
story, some attention must be given, for example, to the dynamics of change
across world regions. The development of country and region-specific sce-
narios may therefore accompany the process of developing global scenar-
ios.
The limitation of a scenario exercise to a particular geographical region car-
ries obvious benefits in terms of making the analysis more tractable and
context-specific. As part of its work on identifying future global challenges,
the World Economic Forum has conducted several regionally-specific sce-
nario analyses in recent years.7 These scenario exercises follow the intuitive
logics approach and are developed with reliance on extensive interviews
and stakeholder workshops. The scenario exercises carried out by theWorld
Economic Forum have focused on rising power centres in the world econ-
omy and include treatments of possible development trajectories of China,
India, and Russia. The Forum has also undertaken studies that have the-
matic rather than geographic emphases, including one project examining
how technology and innovation could transform access to and provision of
financial services and an ongoing project investigating the future of the fi-
nancial services industry. Key elements of the scenario studies on the future
of India and China are briefly outlined below, given the prominent place of
these countries in discussions about what the future of the developing world
will look like.
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The Forum’s scenario project on the future of India was conducted over a
period of sixteen months and included input from some 100 individuals
from the private sector, government, and academia. The scenarios evolved
from the consideration of two main questions: first, how would the quality
of India’s engagement with the world affect its own interests, and second,
how might internal development processes be managed. The scenario
builders generated a matrix where one dimension reflected extremes be-
tween active engagement with the international community and an inward-
looking orientation and another dimension represented the possibilities of
growth that would be exclusive with respect to the nature of the benefits
distributed to society or domestic growth that would be more broad-based
and inclusive. Three scenarios were produced to reflect possible combina-
tions of these dimensions, leaving a fourth matrix-implied possibility (in-
clusive growth and international isolation) out of the final product (WEF
2005).
One instructive feature of the scenario reports produced by the World Eco-
nomic Forum is the structure that is imposed on the finished narratives. The
discussion of India’s evolution over the period 2005–2025 is divided into
four five-year time periods. While the indication of particular occurrences
in specific years also punctuate the narratives, the five-year increments al-
low the scenario builder to chart changes through time without laying out
an overly specific (and perhaps more unbelievable) chronology.
In the scenario labelled “Bolly World”, which describes a future vision of
India that is internationally engaged but domestically divided along eco-
nomic lines, the scenario writers depict an evolution that begins with a pe-
riod (2005–2010) of increased foreign investment in knowledge-intensive
industries that leads to domestic resources being channelled to areas that
are attractive internationally. In the following period (2010–2015), domes-
tic fissures resulting from inadequate investments in areas such as social in-
frastructure and rural development become evident and a divide between
rural and urban areas in India is reinforced. Triggered by a global econom-
ic downturn, the next short period (2015–2020) is characterized by a con-
traction in the nature of international investment that has been facilitated by
a narrow governmental vision that has hindered economic reform and left
persisting social problems unaddressed. In the final period (2020–2025),
India’s economic problems continue, in a manner consistent with the de-
velopments described in the prior periods.
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The summaries of development trajectories that emerge from these narra-
tives condense complex processes into relatively simple storylines. Yet sce-
narios may be deceptively simple research products. Behind the story pre-
sented above, for example, the authors are building on explorations of the
distributional effects of foreign direct investment patterns, the links be-
tween public investment, social welfare, and inequality, and the dynamics
of migration, among other issues.
The scenarios developed by theWorld Economic Forum might be useful for
both governmental actors interested in thinking about what future chal-
lenges they may encounter and business leaders trying to anticipate how
particular markets will evolve. Even if an organization has not participated
in their elaboration, such scenarios may provide a lens for testing strategy
toward these countries. A development agency might for instance be able to
consider how to engage with India in the event that the country follows the
hypothetical course toward sector-specific growth outlined in the above ex-
ample.
Using externally-generated scenarios to support policy planning processes
may also have drawbacks, however. The goals that inform the scenario
building process will likely not be identical to the organization’s goals and
the scenarios may therefore be designed to inform decisions that differ from
the central preoccupations of leaders within the organization. In addition,
considering that the scenario development process itself may be beneficial
in terms of stimulating innovative thinking, organizations that rely on sec-
ond-hand scenarios may miss an opportunity to fundamentally challenge
organizational mindsets.
The Forum’s scenarios on the future of China also relied on consultations
with more than 100 experts from the private sector, government, and the ac-
ademic community. The nature of the matrix selected to organize the sce-
nario project also reinforces the point that has been made about similarities
between scenario building and theory construction. Along one dimension of
the scenario matrix, the Forum’s scenario team considered the shaping role
of the nature of domestic institutional reform in China on its long-term eco-
nomic prospects. Along the second dimension, the scenario builders high-
lighted the relevance of understanding how the quality of the international
environment (i.e. whether it displays an inclusive or discriminatory attitude
toward China) could influence the position of China in the world (WEF
2006). The matrix effectively represents a key area of exploration in the
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field of International Political Economy, namely the examination of the in-
tersection between domestic politics and international relations.
While the China scenarios may also be instructive for governmental offi-
cials or private sector actors for purposes of exploring strategy in the face
of possible challenges, one of the useful points made in the scenario report
that has not yet been referenced in this overview of scenario techniques is
that so-called “wild card” events may be introduced into scenario exercises
in order to integrate discontinuities more directly into the narrative and to
introduce additional stress into the picture with the goal of encouraging re-
flection on more robust strategies. Wild cards are unlikely events that might
have significant consequences. Examples include natural catastrophes, fi-
nancial crises, or epidemics (WEF 2006).
1.7.3 Scenario analysis and the gobal environment
As noted earlier in this study, the environmental field represents another
area where scenario analysis has been widely used. While the technique has
been employed for environmental impact assessments at the local level,
scenarios have also been used to explore the potential consequences of
global environmental change. The most prominent application of scenarios
in the global environmental field has been in the climate change issue area,
where the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), through its
Task Group on Data and Scenario Support for Impact and Climate Analy-
sis, has served as a repository for information for building climate scenar-
ios.8
In addition to providing guidelines for climate modelling, the Task Force is
a source for climate data and data on driving forces including socioeco-
nomic factors. Although the climate scenarios constructed by the IPCC
have a basis in narratives that explain linkages between factors such as de-
mography, socio-economic conditions, and technological change on carbon
emissions, these scenarios, and the climate scenarios produced by re-
searchers exploring the implications of climate change at a regional level,
are elaborated primarily with the aid of quantitative modelling techniques.
Building long-term scenarios for development
German Development Institute 47
8 Information about the Task Group is available at the following website:
http://ipcc-wg1.ucar.edu/wg1/wg1_tgica.html.
DI08-0985 Studie 40:Layout 1  16.12.2008  14:16 Uhr  Seite 47
In a process modelled on the IPCC’s experiences, scenario analysis has al-
so been integrated into the work of the Millennium EcosystemAssessment,
an initiative designed to examine the consequences of ecosystem change
for human well-being and to improve the interface between scientific
knowledge and policymaking on environmental issues.9 In addition to out-
lining scenarios that highlight the relationships between ecosystem change
and development, the research reports of the Millennium Ecosystem As-
sessment are also notable because they position this research effort in rela-
tion to existing scenario exercises in the environmental domain and offer a
detailed overview of the methods used to construct their own scenarios.
In reviewing existing scenario work on the future of the global environment
(including work done by the IPCC, the OECD, and the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development), Millennium Assessment re-
searchers note that there are important commonalities across these global
scenario exercises.10 These commonalities include the nature of the con-
tours of finished scenarios themselves, which tend to identify possible fu-
tures characterized either by an increasing focus on sustainable policy
choices, a slide toward environmental collapse and institutional failure, or
a context where new values shaping development take shape. According to
the Millennium Assessment scenario report, another common point is that
these studies generally “suggest that a global future that excessively relies
on a ‘market forces’ vision of economic globalization and on the consumer
society as a model for successful development would be a perilous basis for
global development.”11 This statement provides an interesting contrast to
the global scenarios produced by Shell in the 1990s, which emphasized
economic globalization as a positive force.
While different types of organizations may undertake scenario work to
achieve a similar kind of understanding about how global systems could
evolve in the future, their own organizational objectives are likely to colour
Erik Lundsgaarde
48 German Development Institute
9 The homepage of the Millennium Assessment can be found at:
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/index.aspx.
10 The discussion in this paragraph and in the paragraphs that follow draws on the
Millennium Assessment’s scenario report, available online at:
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/Scenarios.aspx.
11 The selected quotation can be found on page 42 of the MillenniumAssessment’s scenario
report.
DI08-0985 Studie 40:Layout 1  16.12.2008  14:16 Uhr  Seite 48
how outcomes are depicted. It follows that even if scenarios produced
across a variety of organizations highlight many of the same types of driv-
ing forces of global change, the utility of scenarios developed from one or-
ganizational standpoint may not be equally relevant for organizations that
do not share its goals.
On the basis of a research process involving input from a variety of con-
tributors through interviews, the formulation of qualitative narratives, and
quantitative modelling, the Millennium Assessment produced four scenar-
ios reflecting alternative possibilities for how ecosystems could change to-
ward the year 2050. The scenarios were organized around two key axes of
uncertainty, with one critical uncertainty representing the nature of interna-
tional connectedness (a regionalized or globalized world), and another rep-
resenting the quality of policy responses to environmental challenges (more
or less active and anticipatory environmental management). Hence, the al-
ternative futures follow the general outlines of a globally interconnected
world without active policy responses to environmental change, a regional-
ized world with similarly reactive policy approaches, and worlds where lo-
cal and global environmental management systems are more robust.
In assessing the lessons learned from this scenario analysis, the authors
point to risks that exist in each of the scenarios to emphasize the tradeoffs
that might be involved in moving in one direction or another with respect
to environmental management. In addition to drawing attention to such
tradeoffs, the Millennium Assessment report also suggests that part of its
value to policymakers lies in identifying forces which seem to take on an
irreversible quality (such as deforestation) across the various scenarios, and
which may therefore demand more attention in policy discussions.
As with other scenario exercises, it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of
the initiative described above without having information about how sce-
nario end users have responded to the report’s conclusions. The relative
lack of monitoring of scenario impact in concrete examples of scenario
construction referenced in the preceding pages highlights a critical chal-
lenge for scenario builders: namely, to demonstrate that these methods suc-
ceed in challenging mindsets, calling attention to new priorities, and con-
tributing to the formulation of more robust strategies. While an argument
for adopting a scenario approach can be made on the basis of the observa-
tion that numerous organizations have invested significant resources in car-
rying out such exercises, ultimately this argument by itself is not an entire-
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ly compelling justification for encouraging other organizations to add sce-
nario techniques to their planning portfolios.
1.8 Applications of scenario analysis in the development
policy arena
Without evaluations of how scenarios have informed concrete policy choic-
es, the assessment of the potential contribution of scenario analysis to de-
velopment policymaking lies more in a conceptual review of the method’s
perceived advantages and in an overview of where organizations have in-
vested resources in developing scenarios than in a summary of when sce-
narios have worked and when they have not. As the previous sections of
this paper outline, there are numerous examples of applications of scenario
analysis to areas of inquiry that have points in common with the develop-
ment arena, and these examples help to identify the prospects for applying
scenario techniques to assess global development challenges.
While the examples above focus on exploratory scenarios that address ele-
ments of the global system such as the global security context, the global
economy, and the global environment that are relevant to understanding the
context in which global development occurs, there are also examples of ap-
plications of scenario methods to questions that have a more explicit glob-
al development focus. These examples are discussed briefly below in order
to outline the possible uses of scenario exercises in the development com-
munity.
1.8.1 Scenario-building as an instrument for country or
regional-level dialogue
The openness to multiple perspectives that the scenario approach embodies
suggests a compatibility with participatory approaches in development co-
operation that seek to bring together multiple stakeholder groups to devel-
op common strategies for addressing development goals. As theMont Fleur
example early in this study illustrated, because scenario exercises often aim
to generate multiple plausible futures rather than a single vision of the fu-
ture, they may promote dialogue, as individuals are allowed to explore how
the future could develop independent of their own particular interests.
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One initiative that fits with this participatory orientation of scenario analy-
sis is the work carried out by the African Futures Institute to support the
preparation of National Long-Term Prospective Studies (NLTPS) across the
African continent. This program, initiated by the United Nations Develop-
ment Program in 1992, has supported the completion of 25 long-term stud-
ies that have aimed to stimulate dialogue on how African countries can at-
tain the short and medium-term development goals related to the Millenni-
um Development Goals and individual Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
while promoting a long-term vision for the future of a given country.12
Through its East African Scenarios Project, the Society for International
Development (SID) has also sought to use the scenario approach to pro-
mote idea exchanges between non-governmental organizations, private sec-
tor representatives, and governmental actors. This ongoing initiative is de-
signed to produce insight about emerging trends and drivers of change in
the East African region, and also to contribute to reflection on the political
future of the region as a whole.13
The future of Southern Africa has similarly been explored via scenario
analysis. A project financed by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and carried out
in partnership with the Johannesburg-based Institute for Global Dialogue
over several years beginning in 1997 painted five different scenarios for
how the future of the Southern African region could evolve toward the year
2020. The project was designed to examine the challenges that the South
African Development Community in particular might face in trying to meet
its objectives related to enhanced regional integration and economic devel-
opment.
Following the approach outlined by Schwartz (1996), the project re-
searchers outlined scenarios that highlighted prospects for a destabilized
and unequal region with collapsed states on its fringes, the potential for pri-
vate actors playing a dominant role in shaping patterns of economic activi-
ty and political outcomes, the possibility of a regional renaissance driven by
good democratic leadership and prudent management of natural resource
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wealth, the spectre of a slow return to authoritarian rule, and the prospect
of a poor region that is nevertheless politically stable (IGD / FES 2004).
Each of the narratives presented in the scenario compendium was paired
with a set of policy implications, however the policy recommendations that
are listed are quite broad in nature. For instance, an implication drawn from
the scenario pointing to the prospect of a destabilizing region is that
regional conflict resolution mechanisms should be maintained. The
concluding chapter of the book presenting these scenarios includes a para-
graph evaluating the usefulness of the scenario exercises. The author notes
that:
“…the test of our scenarios thus far is not whether any one of them is in
the process of being realised. It is whether they are proving to have iden-
tified at least some of the key factors at work in the region; given some
idea of how those factors and forces could play themselves out; and shown
that they can help to inform decision-makers’ perceptions of the region
and its underlying dynamics.” (IGD / FES 2004, 132)
This statement underlines the limited goals that the scenario method often
seeks to achieve. The long process that contributes to the formulation of
scenarios may be viewed as a vehicle for generating discussion on chal-
lenges that lie ahead and to highlight the shortcomings of current political
approaches to key issues. Steering a country or a region toward a desirable
future or away from an undesirable one requires the enactment of concrete
policy measures that may not be instantly at the disposal of policymakers
on the completion of a scenario building initiative.
The limited detailed policy proposals that emerge from many scenario ex-
ercises may also stem from the broad reach of these projects rather than
with an inability of the method to generate such recommendations. A sce-
nario exercise that is global in scope, for instance, may naturally draw very
broad conclusions, whereas a geographically and thematically focused ex-
ercise may be able to deliver more specific proposals.
1.8.2 Scenario building and strategic reflection in
development aid organizations
The final illustration of a scenario exercise that this overview of scenario
methods discusses is a scenario initiative conducted by a research team led
by Enrique Rueda-Sabater in the World Bank’s strategy group (Rueda-
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Sabater et al. 2006).14 The study was oriented around the following re-
search question: “what major changes in the world by 2020 could signifi-
cantly reshape international development?”(ibid., 3). In attempting to an-
swer this question, the researchers adopted an exploratory approach to sce-
nario development mirroring the global scenario projects applying the intu-
itive logics approach described above.
The research group’s report includes four sections. The first section maps
out key trends related to demography, the characteristics of the global econ-
omy, the state of the environment and natural resources, patterns in science
and technology including trends in research and development, governance
issues at global and national levels, and global security trends covering is-
sues such as intrastate conflict, terrorism, and organized crime. These
trends are listed because they are considered to be driving forces of global
change. By outlining key aspects of these trends, researchers can begin to
assess the importance and uncertainty associated with individual drivers.
The second section of the report presents the scenarios that are organized
around three main dimensions of uncertainty. One dimension reflects alter-
native geopolitical dynamics, with possibilities ranging from a US or G-7
dominated world system, to a fragmented global system, to one where
emerging powers play an increasingly influential role. A second dimension
relates to the quality of economic growth (stagnation, uneven growth, or
broad-based growth), while a third dimension reflects whether non-state ac-
tors play a weak, moderate, or strong role in fulfilling functions tradition-
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ally associated with governments. These multiple dimensions generate pos-
sibilities for many scenarios, however for purposes of simplicity, three sce-
narios are developed in detail.
As with other examples of global scenario exercises, these dimensions re-
late to general theoretical preoccupations of researchers examining the
global political economy. While the strategy group’s report indicates that it
does not consider scenarios to be theories because of their limited causal
properties, the orienting dimensions of the scenario exercise nevertheless
suggest an affinity between scenario construction and theory construction.
The third section of the Rehearsing the Future report assesses the implica-
tions of the scenario exercise for international development. While the sce-
narios themselves were designed to map out the context in which future de-
velopment policy interventions would take place rather than how develop-
ment assistance policy would evolve in its own right, the implications sec-
tion considers this second question by focusing on the nature of the demand
for aid and the nature of the supply of aid suggested by the various scenar-
ios. These implications are summarized briefly below.
In the scenario labelled “Affluence Ltd.” demand for development assis-
tance is strongest in the so-called least-competitive countries that have not
been able to harness forces of globalization in their favour, while aid pro-
vision, increasingly occurring through private channels or through sector-
specific ministries rather than through more traditional bilateral aid agen-
cies, focuses on goals related to the management of interdependence and
addressing persistent development needs in the countries excluded from
globalization’s benefits. In the scenario named “Globalization Unwinding”,
aid flows decline in spite of the persistence of major challenges in many
parts of the developing world, due to growing mistrust among nations and
a shift in focus in aid provision away from development toward security
and other political goals. The “Competing Horizons” scenario suggests a
world where aid flows will rise due to the increasing prominence of non-
traditional aid donors. The provision of aid in this scenario is however like-
ly to follow commercial rather than development motives.
A final brief section of Rehearsing the Future discusses how organizations
can incorporate the scenarios prepared by the strategy group or scenarios of
their own making into a process of strategic reflection. At the core of such
a process is the assessment of how the broad external conditions sketched
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out in the scenarios will affect key clients of the organization as well as oth-
er actors that are operating in its environment. An organization might then
further assess opportunities and risks that are implied by the scenarios and
discuss the types of priorities that would need to be adopted in order for the
organization to thrive in its future environment.
1.9 Conclusion
The study of the future is inherently difficult. Scenario analysis methods
have been proposed as one means of dealing with the uncertainty that is
pervasive in thinking about how things might change over the course of a
long prospective time horizon. Scenario approaches highlight the value in
developing multiple pictures of how the world could develop to cover the
range of future possibilities. They build storylines on an existing knowl-
edge base, but also aim to stimulate new insight on future challenges by in-
corporating a diversity of perspectives into the scenario building process.
These basic characteristics of scenario analysis, the integration of a long
time horizon and the commitment to recognizing the possibility that a mul-
tiplicity of described outcomes could materialize, are key elements that
help to account for why scenario analysis has been used to support planning
efforts in a variety of contexts.
The openness to multiple perspectives that is characteristic of well-execut-
ed scenario analysis can inform other research efforts, which might simi-
larly benefit from casting a wide net among actors that have expertise in a
particular area. In the development policy sphere, the discussion of direc-
tions for policy with representatives from civil society organizations, pri-
vate industry, and government may not only help to identify innovative pol-
icy priorities, but also to place policies on a stronger political footing. In-
deed, in some donor countries such multi-stakeholder dialogues are already
institutionalized in the development assistance policymaking process.
Both the theoretical treatments of scenario analysis discussed above and the
specific illustrations provided indicate that scenario analysis is well-suited
to exploratory analysis. The discussion also emphasized that scenarios can
be a useful tool for opening a reflection process within organizations. Yet
there are clear limitations to scenario methods as well. Importantly, the ac-
tual impact of scenario exercises in enhancing decision-making processes
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has not been well-demonstrated, even though such methods have been ap-
plied in a variety of organizational contexts over the past several decades.
The ability of a scenario exercise to contribute to the improvement of or-
ganizational strategy will likely also depend on the extent to which key de-
cision makers within an organization are engaged in the scenario develop-
ment process. This engagement can take various forms, from participating
in interviews that help to define the decision focus of the exercise and iden-
tify key challenges in the external environment to direct involvement on the
team that is primarily responsible for elaborating scenarios. Engagement at
high levels within an organization signals a commitment to the effort to
search for new ways of viewing the world that can help organization’s iden-
tify emerging challenges. In contrast, if key decision makers are not in-
volved in a scenario process, such an exercise may be less useful in chang-
ing existing perceptions.
In thinking about the place of scenario analysis as a tool for policy planning
support, another key limitation is that the nature of recommendations that
emerge from scenario building exercises may be quite broad. While the lev-
el of abstraction in policy recommendations that are produced may reflect
the scope of the research question itself, meaning that scenario-building
that is geographically and thematically limited in scope may generate more
specific recommendations, the formulation of detailed policy actions is
something that will require additional deliberation among policymakers
themselves, who will be prodded to consider risks and opportunities in
adopting a particular strategy in the context of the multiple scenarios they
are offered. In short, scenario analysis is a tool for spurring strategic re-
flection more than an instrument for devising responses to future challenges
in its own right.
Highlighting these limitations of the scenario approach is useful in adopt-
ing realistic expectations about what scenario building can accomplish.
While the method may be helpful in encouraging long-term thinking with-
in aid agencies, other research methods are likely to be better suited to de-
livering clear proposals on how to deal with a range of specific questions
about the future of development policy. Case-study research on questions
of institutional design may for example be better able to offer recommen-
dations on how to reform development assistance policymaking structures
and aid delivery systems, even if the value of alternative institutional set-
ups can be evaluated in light of how well they might respond to challenges
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raised by different scenarios of the future. Hence, rather than displacing
other research methods in thinking about new directions for development
policy, scenario analysis should be regarded as a supplement to these ap-
proaches, which may be valuable in producing knowledge that can be inte-
grated into scenario analysis projects by themselves.
2 Scenario analysis and FDI flows to Africa
2.1 Introduction
This section of the study provides an illustration of scenario building by
constructing four scenarios dealing with how patterns of foreign direct in-
vestment to Africa could evolve toward the year 2030 and what the poten-
tial development consequences of changes in this area might be.
The last two decades have witnessed a significant rise in direct investment
in developing economies. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, the volume of direct in-
vestment in the developing world has outpaced official development assis-
tance handsomely since the early 1990s and now eclipses development aid
transfers by a wide margin. In 2006, direct investment in developing
economies amounted to some US$ 379 billion, in comparison to US$ 105
billion in overseas assistance (OECD 2008; UNCTAD 2008a). In 2007, in-
vestment in the developing world reached a new high of US$ 500 billion, a
21 percent increase over the previous year (UNCTAD 2008e).
As the volume of direct investment has increased, the importance of mobi-
lizing additional financial resources for development efforts through for-
eign direct investment has also gained an increasingly prominent place in
international development discourse. In example, the Report of the Interna-
tional Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey in 2002 list-
ed measures to increase foreign direct investment and other private capital
flows behind only domestic resource mobilization as a necessary step in
achieving the Millennium Development Goals. This document encouraged
developing countries to enhance efforts to increase their attractiveness to
foreign investors and underlined the responsibility of developed countries
to adopt measures to facilitate outward investment toward poor countries
(UN 2002). In preparation for the Doha conference on financing for devel-
opment, the United Nations has reiterated this call for greater investment,
emphasizing the need to increase investment in Africa, in the world’s least-
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developed countries, and in countries facing particular disadvantages due to
their geography in particular (UN 2008a).
Because the mobilization of private capital does not depend on a domestic
budgetary process in donor countries where numerous interests must be ac-
commodated, encouraging direct investment might be considered a con-
venient political alternative to relying on public channels of development
financing. The growing scale of resource transfers to developing countries
through private channels suggests that exploring how investment patterns
could evolve in the coming decades will help to inform what types of pri-
orities development assistance policy might need to incorporate in the fu-
ture, since these private flows carry the potential to impact the quality of
development processes, affect how resources are distributed among actors
Figure 2.1: ODA and FDI volumes (1980–2006)*)
*) The figure highlights that while direct investment and aid flows toward developing
economies were comparable in the 1980s, the volume of direct investment flows toward
developing countries has significantly outdistanced aid flows since the early 1990s. The
figures are listed in current dollars for purposes of consistency between the OECD aid
and UNCTAD FDI figures.
Sources: OECD (2008); UNCTAD (2008a)
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within economies, and influence the opportunities that are available to the
individuals development assistance is intended to serve.
While overall volumes of foreign direct investment toward the developing
world have expanded significantly in recent decades, this expansion has not
affected all regions of the world equally. The emerging market economies
of Asia and Latin America have been privileged recipients of foreign direct
investment (FDI), while poorer economies around the world have been less
attractive to foreign investors in comparison. Though investment in devel-
oping economies accounted for 27 percent of all foreign direct investment
in 2006, for example, only .7 % of global investment was directed toward
the world’s least developed countries (LDCs) in that year (UNCTAD
2008b).
As figure 2.2 indicates, while most regions of the developing world re-
ceived relatively little direct investment in the 1980s, the takeoff in direct
investment in the 1990s was fuelled especially by a growing interest in Chi-
na as an investment destination: in 1980, foreign investment in China
amounted to US$ 57 million, but by 2006 it had approached US$ 70 billion.
In contrast, investment on the African continent has lagged behind these in-
creases. While investment in Africa totalled a little over US$ 400 million in
1980, it was about exactly half as significant as investment in China in
2006, amounting to some US$ 36 billion (UNCTAD 2007c). Even though
investment in Africa has increased in recent years, the continent remains
marginal as a destination for investment: between 2000 and 2006, the share
of investment inAfrica hovered around 3 % of global FDI flows (UNCTAD
2008d).
While Africa has traditionally received less investment than other regions
of the developing world, exploring the future of investment on the African
continent may be especially relevant for an exploration of the future of de-
velopment policy for multiple reasons. Although donors have not always
followed through on their aid commitments directed toward the African
continent, they have nevertheless pledged in recent years to substantially
increase their aid flows to Africa, including by calling for a doubling of aid
toward 2010 (OECD / ADB 2008). This suggests that decisions about fu-
ture development assistance priorities will increasingly be focused on
African development issues.
Building long-term scenarios for development
German Development Institute 59
DI08-0985 Studie 40:Layout 1  16.12.2008  14:17 Uhr  Seite 59
The increased attention to African development reflects the fact that the
continent possesses the highest concentration of less-developed and low in-
come countries in the world and is also considered to be the region of the
world where the Millennium Development Goals will be the most difficult
to achieve by 2015. The difficulty that Africa faces in achieving these goals
is itself a reflection of the difficulties of meeting the development finance
objectives outlined in the Monterrey Consensus, which involves mobilizing
both additional public and private resources (UNECA 2008).
By focusing on the African continent as a whole, this exercise paints a
broad picture of possible direct investment patterns that glosses over the
specificities of individual African countries. Due to their distinct geogra-
Erik Lundsgaarde
60 German Development Institute
Figure 2.2: Geographical distribution of FDI flows (1980–2006)*)
*) This figure charts the progression of FDI to Africa, Latin America, East Asia, and
South Asia over the period 1980 to 2006. The volume of investment that China has
attracted is listed separately in this chart, even though it is also included in the sum of
investment toward East Asia.
Source: UNCTAD (2008a)
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phies, economic and political structures, and other distinguishing charac-
teristics, there would naturally be large variations across the continent in
terms of the range of scenarios for the future of direct investment if this
study were confined to the country level. This study seeks to acknowledge
relevant variations across the continent to the extent possible, but accepts a
basic trade-off favouring generalization over attention to national variation
that comes with the adoption of a regional focus.
To map out possible directions that investment inAfrica might take over the
next couple of decades, this analysis proceeds as follows. The first section
provides an overview of FDI as a development instrument in order to offer
a general starting point for how FDI can shape development prospects in
the long term. The second section establishes a basis for scenario construc-
tion by mapping out recent economic trends in Africa and trends in FDI
provision in particular. The third section of this paper explores likely driv-
ing forces of investment patterns by summarizing findings from the litera-
ture on the determinants of FDI flows. The section is followed by an as-
sessment of driving factors that can be identified as critical uncertainties
that can provide a basic framework for distinguishable narratives about the
future. A final section presents scenarios for the future of investment in
Africa based on combinations of these driving forces.
In the first part of this study, scenario analysis techniques were discussed in
detail. One of the main points that the discussion revealed about scenario
analysis in practice is that it often relies on multidisciplinary research teams
that ensure that a variety of perspectives are represented in the scenario
construction process. Collecting inputs in a scenario building process may
be time-consuming, and scenario analysis can often take a minimum of sev-
eral months to complete, though the duration of the process is likely to de-
pend on the scope of the research question. The possibilities for casting a
wide net in terms of gathering expert opinion for this scenario building ef-
fort are in contrast quite limited. While this application seeks to conform to
the general process of scenario construction outlined in Part I of this study,
the source of thinking about potential driving forces of future investment
patterns largely stems from a review of existing theoretical and empirical
work on FDI and development rather than from structured idea generation
processes involving interviewing and group discussions. The present ex-
ample may therefore be considered a test of the proposition that scenario
construction can take cues from theory construction efforts and may serve
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as an example of how scenarios can be constructed when a full-fledged sce-
nario development process is not feasible.
2.2 Foreign direct investment as a development instrument
Foreign direct investment (FDI) refers to “an investment involving a long-
term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident
entity in one economy…in an enterprise resident in an economy other than
that of the foreign direct investor” (UNCTAD 2007c, 245). Although FDI
is generally an inter-firm activity, because state-controlled enterprises may
also seek to invest abroad, it is not necessarily always a private one.
The long-term component of the above definition leads to one distinction
between FDI and other sources of private capital: it is considered to be less
volatile as a financing instrument than other private capital flows (Albu-
querque 2003). In comparison to other private capital flows, then, the po-
tential for FDI to make a lasting contribution to development processes
should be greater. Indeed, numerous development benefits of FDI have
been touted. The investments that foreign enterprises make in productive
sectors of the economy potentially generate employment opportunities and
income and contribute to an increased revenue base that a government can
tap into to finance investments in public services. FDI is also thought to
produce efficiency gains by stimulating competition and lowering prices
for goods and services. In addition, FDI has the potential to produce posi-
tive spill-over effects in the local economy, for example by serving as a ve-
hicle for the diffusion of managerial practices or innovative technologies
(OECD 2002a; World Bank 2005).
In spite of these potential benefits, the effect of FDI on economic growth
and development is not unambiguous. Because much investment comes
through the acquisition of existing enterprises, direct investment may not
always offer a stimulus for capital accumulation in the host economy, and
possible spill-over effects may be curbed by firms’ desire to protect trade
secrets (UNCTAD 2005). Kosack and Tobin (2006) note that FDI may con-
tribute to a decline in local entrepreneurial activity or a diminished tax base,
depending on how a given government goes about attracting investment.
Given the ambiguous nature of the relationship between FDI and develop-
ment, Kosack and Tobin argue that it is necessary to examine both the type
of FDI a country obtains and a government’s capacity to absorb benefits
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from these investments in evaluating the contribution of FDI to economic
growth or human development (Kosack / Tobin 2006).
In exploring how FDI might change the development landscape in the fu-
ture, it is therefore important to consider its composition and to understand
its relationship to other factors in host countries that might be influential in
shaping development outcomes. In other words, understanding the future
development impact of FDI requires more than simply outlining whether
investment will increase or decrease, since FDI can have both positive and
negative effects and the context into which it is injected can also shape the
nature of the impact of these investments.
2.3 Recent trends in investment in Africa
In order to have a basis for generating stories about how the future of in-
vestment on the African continent might unfold, it is first helpful to provide
a descriptive overview of recent economic trends in Africa and trends in
FDI provision in particular. The general economic prognosis for Africa as a
whole has been positive in recent years. In its latest African Economic Out-
look, the OECD reports that the African continent enjoyed a GDP growth
rate of 5.7 % in 2007, continuing a trend in above-average growth over the
last several years. Positive growth rates have characterized economic per-
formance across African regions, though these high growth rates have been
driven especially by rising commodities prices, which has benefited oil and
mineral exporters in particular. African economic conditions have also been
regarded as generally favourable due to improved macroeconomic man-
agement. Oil exporters have achieved significant budget surpluses, while
countries across the continent have been credited with maintaining fiscal
discipline (OECD / ADB 2008).
Notwithstanding the generally positive macroeconomic context, African
countries currently face a broad variety of development challenges. The
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) notes, for ex-
ample, that rising inequality has accompanied the continent’s high eco-
nomic growth rates, suggesting that many disadvantaged groups have not
benefited from this growth (UNECA 2008). Social development challenges
remain great: all 22 countries placed in the category of “low human devel-
opment” in the UNDP’s most recent Human Development Report are lo-
cated on the African continent (UNDP 2007). Progress toward achieving
the Millennium Development Goals has been limited on many measures in
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Sub-Saharan Africa: absolute poverty has increased, limited improvements
have been registered in the areas of primary education, child and maternal
health, and water quality, and the share of the region’s population living
with HIV/AIDS is the highest in the world (UN 2008b).
Against this backdrop, FDI toward Africa has nevertheless been trending
upward in recent years, mirroring overall trends in economic performance.
As Figure 2.3 demonstrates, there has been important variation on the con-
tinent with respect to where investment increases have been concentrated,
however. North African countries have accounted for a comparatively large
share of recent investment increases, almost doubling from around US$ 7
billion in 2004 to US$ 13.5 billion in 2005 and nearly doubling again be-
tween 2005 and 2006 to surpass US$ 23 billion in 2006. This sum repre-
sented about 65 percent of investment in Africa in that year (UNCTAD
2008b). Other regions have also experienced significant investment in-
creases: between 2000 and 2006 inward FDI to West Africa increased from
US$ 2.2 billion to US$ 6.8 billion, investment in Central Africa rose from
US$ 552 million to US$ 3.8 billion, and investment in EastAfrica rose from
US$ 1 billion to US$ 1.8 billion (UNCTAD 2008b).
Investment in Africa has also been marked by national and sectoral con-
centration. As tables 2.1 and 2.2 indicate, many of the same countries have
figured among the leading recipients of FDI since 2000, while the list of
states receiving the least investment also features recurring characters in-
cluding several small island territories.
According to UNCTAD (2008d), the top ten recipients of FDI in 2006 wel-
comed approximately 90 percent of all FDI to Africa. Egypt, Nigeria, and
South Africa are the continent’s economic powerhouses and have also been
its leading investment destinations. While countries such as Egypt and Mo-
rocco have attracted diversified investments, much of the recent growth in
investment across the continent has been focused in the primary sector, par-
ticularly in investments related to extractive industries (UNCTAD 2007c).
Because of the heavy resource-seeking orientation of recent investment in-
flows, questions can be raised about the positive nature of their develop-
mental impact.
While resource-seeking investments can provide a source of government
revenue, the capital-intensive quality of investments in extractive industries
means that they are less likely to generate positive spillover effects with re-
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Figure 2.3: FDI inflows by African region (1990–2006)*)
*) This chart highlights that a relatively large share of recent increases in investment
toward Africa are accounted for by increased investment in North Africa. A positive
trend is nevertheless visible across regions on the African continent. According to the
figures presented here, SouthernAfrica is the only region that experienced a significant
drop in investment toward the end of this period. The data presented here reflects net
FDI inflows, and the drop in investment to Southern Africa is accounted for by large
sell offs of foreign-owned oil assets inAngola at the end of the period. SouthernAfrica,
and South Africa in particular, has also been an important destination for FDI.
Source: (UNCTAD 2008d)
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spect to increasing local employment or generating linkages to local firms.
Intensified mineral and oil extraction can also contribute to environmental
degradation. Even the revenue that states potentially obtain from resource
exploitation can be risky from a development perspective, as the availabil-
ity of resource rents might distance political elites from taxpayers they
might otherwise be interested in providing services for or lead them to neg-
lect making productive investments in other sectors of the economy that
would contribute to broad-based growth (UNCTAD 2007c).
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In addition to considering which countries and regions on the African con-
tinent have been privileged destinations for FDI and identifying the sectoral
emphasis of FDI to Africa, it is helpful to briefly make note of current
trends in terms of where investment to Africa originates. Foreign invest-
ment in Africa has traditionally been dominated by firms headquartered in
major industrialized countries. While data at a continental level on sources
of investment is scarce, estimates available from UNCTAD indicate that in
2003, for instance, FDI stock in Africa held by enterprises from the United
Kingdom amounted to some US$ 30 billion, American FDI stock totalled
US$ 19 billion, and German, French, and Japanese investors followed with
US$ 5.5 billion, US$ 4.4 billion, and US$ 2 billion in FDI stock respec-
tively.15 The combined sum of these investments was the equivalent of ap-
proximately 30 percent of African FDI stock in that year (UNCTAD 2006;
2008b).
One general trend in global direct investment patterns in recent years has
been the growth of outward investment from developing countries, an in-
crease that has contributed to a rise in South-South investment flows. Most
South-South flows are intra-regional. In Africa, South African outward in-
vestment has for example represented an important source of capital for
countries in its regional neighbourhood: South African investors have in re-
cent years provided over half of the investment headed into neighbouring
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (UNCTAD 2006). Africa has also be-
come an increasingly important destination for investment from developing
Asia. Between 2002 and 2004, FDI flows from developing Asia to Africa
averaged US$ 1.2 billion per year, with Singapore, India, and Malaysia rep-
resenting the leading Asian sources of investment.
While China’s economic relations with Africa have recently attracted sig-
nificant attention, Chinese FDI to Africa is both small in relation to overall
Chinese outward direct investment and in relation to FDI to Africa as a
whole. Chinese investment in Africa represented about 3 percent of total
Chinese outward investment in 2003, and it has only very recently expand-
ed significantly in terms of its absolute volume. Between 1999 and 2003,
Chinese FDI toward Africa was well below US$ 100 million annually,
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while in 2004 investments topped US$ 300 million and about US$ 400 mil-
lion in investment was provided in 2005 (UNCTAD 2007a).
The emergence of developing countries as important sources of FDI is nev-
ertheless a key trend to be conscious of in exploring how patterns of in-
vestment could evolve in the future. At the same time, the persistent pres-
ence of investors from capital-rich OECD countries in Africa is also a rel-
evant background element in thinking about the future of investment in
Africa, because economic and political developments in these countries
will likely shape the nature of the future supply of FDI.
In a recent overview of investment prospects in Africa based on investor
surveys, UNCTAD, a primary source of data and analysis on investment
flows in the developing world, has suggested that short-term investment
prospects for the continent are unlikely to depart from Africa’s longstand-
ing marginalization on the global FDI scene, since Asian countries, Euro-
pean transition economies, and developed countries continue to be consid-
ered more highly preferred investment destinations for multinational firms
(UNCTAD 2007b). Nevertheless, the organization has pointed to regional
efforts to promote economic integration and improve the investment cli-
mate, as well as potential for greater economic diversification in leading
destinations of FDI in presenting a generally optimistic prognosis for how
FDI volumes might be expected to evolve in the coming years (UNCTAD
2008d).
2.4 Exploring drivers of FDI patterns
The literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment flows offers
a basis for identifying key drivers of change that could shape investment
patterns toward Africa in the future. This section discusses potential drivers
of investment patterns by highlighting geographic, economic, and political
factors that are thought to affect decisions to invest abroad. The FDI deter-
minants listed below have been analysed extensively in a literature seeking
to identify the sources of cross-national variation in attractiveness to in-
vestment. This section first presents these drivers of change in theoretical
terms, and then briefly reviews existing evidence of the relevance of these
drivers to the African context.
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2.4.1 Geographic determinants of FDI
Geography is a basic factor influencing international economic relations. In
the international trade literature, gravity models use the distance between
markets as a main predictor of trade flows (Bergstrand 1985). Proximity to
major markets can therefore influence where export-oriented investment is
directed. Geographic factors have also been identified as important deter-
minants of economic development prospects. Gallup et al. (1998) observe
for example that countries that are land-locked have more restricted eco-
nomic development potential than countries with easier access to coastal re-
gions. These authors also note that tropical climates can carry the dual dis-
advantage of constraining agricultural productivity and increasing the inci-
dence of disease among the labour force. Geography might then be expect-
ed to influence investment patterns due to both the way that it shapes the
integration of economies into global production and exchange networks
and how it influences domestic economic conditions. Finally, a country’s
natural resource endowments represent another commonly identified geo-
graphic determinant of investment flows (Asiedu 2005). African countries
that are more geographically isolated can in general be expected to have
continued difficulty in attracting foreign investment in the future, while re-
source-rich states may have better prospects.
2.4.2 Economic determinants of FDI
Several characteristics of the receiving economy have also been empha-
sized in research on the determinants of direct investment. The size of the
market in a host economy as well as its economic growth potential can en-
courage firms to relocate production there, and general macroeconomic
conditions including inflation rates are also likely to figure into investment
decisions (De Mello 1997). The demographic characteristics of a host coun-
try as well as income levels and income growth can in turn represent un-
derlying forces that influence market size and hence attractiveness as an in-
vestment destination.
The availability and quality of factors of production are additional eco-
nomic considerations for foreign investors. In example, the ability of firms
to achieve efficiency gains in production will be shaped in part by the avail-
ability of labour in the host country. While the nature of the demand for
labour will likely vary depending on the investors’ industry, the skill level
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of the workforce can be listed alongside other economic determinants of
FDI flows. The quality of local infrastructure is another factor that can in-
fluence firm productivity and hence investment decisions (Asiedu 2002).
As these general economic factors improve, so too should the environment
for direct investment.
2.4.3 Political determinants of FDI
The economic characteristics of the host economy may themselves be
shaped by political forces, which can influence the stability of the context
in which investment is provided, the local operating constraints that enter-
prises are subject to and benefits they receive from establishing operations
in a given country, the nature of complementary investments made by the
public sector, and the character of economic and regulatory policies.
At a broad level, one important element of the political context in a host
country or region is its proneness to conflict or the potential for reversals of
political regimes in power (Asiedu 2002). As noted above, foreign direct in-
vestment can be considered a more long-term phenomenon than other types
of private financial transfers. Hence, foreign firms are likely to favour lo-
cations where there is greater predictability in the political outlook that
would suggest for example that production disruptions will be more limit-
ed and that commitments made by the government welcoming investors
will continue to be respected.
The question of whether investors’ general preference for stability trans-
lates into a preference for investing in countries with a particular type of po-
litical regime has been widely debated. Summarizing the literature assess-
ing multinationals’ preferences for authoritarian versus democratic regimes,
Schulz (2007) notes that while some scholars have argued that authoritari-
an regimes can be beneficial for multinational firms because they may have
more power to enact policies that privilege the wishes of foreign firms over
the wishes of local populations, many other analysts have argued that dem-
ocratic regimes are likely to provide better investment conditions because
democracies are better at upholding contracts and providing social stabili-
ty. According to Schulz, the mixed assessments of the importance of regime
type to investors’ decisions likely reflects limited analytical attention to the
differences in determinants of different types of FDI flows: investment in
natural resource extraction may for example be less sensitive to considera-
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tions of regime type than investments that are targeted toward establishing
firms’ footholds in a foreign market or increasing the efficiency of their
production processes (Schulz 1997).
In recent years, the role of government in generating favourable conditions
for domestic and international investors has been emphasized in work sup-
porting developing countries’ efforts to improve their investment climates.
Following the definition outlined by the World Bank, the investment cli-
mate refers to: “the many location-specific factors that shape the opportu-
nities and incentives for firms to invest productively, create jobs, and ex-
pand” (2005). This concept includes a wide range of conditions that gov-
ernments can contribute to maintaining.
Security and stability are considered to represent basic background factors
that shape the quality of the investment environment. In its 2005World De-
velopment Report, the World Bank stresses this point by noting that “the
outbreak of war or other widespread violence spells the end of almost all
productive investment” (World Bank 2005, 9). Governments also shape the
character of the investment climate by influencing the cost of doing busi-
ness through their taxation policies, regulatory requirements, and efforts to
limit corruption. In short, political institutions and government policy
choices are likely to determine how attractive a particular location is to for-
eign investors. International investment agreements, such as bilateral in-
vestment treaties or double-taxation treaties that offer reassurances to for-
eign firms that their assets will be protected and that their profits will not
be overly taxed represent further examples of how government policy
choices can influence investment patterns.
2.4.4 FDI determinants in the African context
As a final part of the discussion providing a background for the exploration
of future investment patterns on the African continent, this section briefly
reviews empirical findings that assess the relevance of key investment driv-
ers in Africa. In a study of investment in 22 Sub-Saharan African countries
from 1984 to 2000, Asiedu (2005) finds a positive correlation between nat-
ural resource availability, the size of domestic markets, policy factors such
as macroeconomic stability and infrastructure provision and the level of in-
vestment in countries across the continent, and also finds evidence that cor-
ruption and political instability act as deterrents to investment.
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While these results underscore the relevance of widely-acknowledged pre-
dictors of FDI flows to Africa, other work by Asiedu indicates that the dy-
namics of investment in Africa do not perfectly mirror global investment
logics. Asiedu (2002) suggests that a country within Sub-Saharan Africa is
likely to receive less investment in comparison to a hypothetical country
outside of the continent that has similar characteristics affecting investment
prospects. This observation leads Asiedu to conclude that “there is an un-
accounted for ‘Africa effect’ – suggesting that the inability of countries in
Sub-Saharan Africa to attract FDI may in part be blamed on the fact that
these countries are located in a continent that happens to have a bad repu-
tation” (Asiedu 2002).
Dupasquier and Osakwe (2005) have in a similar vein suggested that
African countries as a whole have attracted less FDI than might be expect-
ed given their economic potential. These authors offer a variety of expla-
nations for Africa’s poor record in attracting FDI. These include the preva-
lence of conflict – the African continent is more war-prone than other re-
gions of the world – economic instability, the lack of a favourable invest-
ment climate in many countries, and the prevalence of corruption. While
Asiedu (2004) notes that the performance of African countries on measures
of the quality of their policy environments has improved in recent years,
these improvements have been outpaced by reforms in other parts of the de-
veloping world that have been able to attract a larger share of global FDI
flows.
2.5 Critical uncertainties regarding future
investment flows
The above discussions of the potential development impact of FDI and the
determinants of FDI can serve to help build storylines for the scenarios that
follow. As the outline of scenario methods in Part I of this study indicated,
one of the main foundations of a scenario analysis exercise is the delin-
eation of critical uncertainties, those drivers of change that are considered
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to be both highly important and unpredictable. These uncertainties can be
represented on a matrix that serves as the basis for generating four scenar-
ios that display a wide range of variation from one another.
The discussion of drivers of change provides some clues about factors that
may be considered more predictable or unpredictable in determining the na-
ture of FDI flows in the future. Geographic factors are for example fixed.
While technological developments or improved infrastructure may mitigate
the effects of the geographic isolation of land-locked African countries in
the future, these countries will likely continue to face greater development
challenges than countries with access to the sea. Similarly, natural resource
endowments might be considered a fixed asset, and natural resource-rich
countries will likely continue to draw investment in the primary sector.
The factors listed as economic determinants of investment patterns may be
more mixed in terms of their levels of predictability. As noted earlier in this
study, demographic trends have often been considered to be relatively pre-
dictable in nature. According to UN projections, the population of the
African continent is expected to increase significantly between 2010 and
2030, rising from just over 1 billion in 2010 to somewhere between 1.4 and
1.74 billion by the end of this period (UN Population Division 2006).16
These demographic changes potentially generate economic benefits, for in-
stance by expanding the size of markets that may be attractive for foreign
investors and increasing the size of the labour force. Yet with this demo-
graphic growth, other economic pressures can also emerge, since larger
populations will potentially place greater strain on natural resources and put
increased demands on states in the area of service provision. Continued
high population growth rates may effectively offset overall economic
growth gains and lead to increased conflict both in urban areas and over
land on the African continent (Vimard 2008).
Political factors may display a higher degree of uncertainty in terms of how
they will evolve in the future. As the above discussion highlighted, one
main deterrent for foreign investors in Africa has been the continent’s po-
litical instability. Following the end of the Cold War, the African continent
was beset with internal conflict. According to the UK Department for In-
ternational Development, violent conflict affected a majority of African
countries and 20 percent of African populations in 2000. In 2003, African
countries accounted for 46 percent of the developing nations experiencing
conflict (DFID et al. 2004).
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While there have been signs in recent years of movement toward the peace-
ful resolution of conflicts in disparate corners of the continent, the spectre
of renewed conflict remains in a political context where governments may
have only a tenuous hold on power. The stability of states on the African
continent can be considered an underlying determinant of future economic
prospects and of the perceived risks for foreign firms deciding on whether
they should invest resources in a given locale. This analysis selects politi-
cal stability as one critical uncertainty driving future investment patterns
for this reason.
The list of determinants of investment provided above focuses exclusively
on characteristics of receiving countries. Yet it is also relevant to consider
how investment patterns might be altered due to factors that are beyond the
control of receiving countries themselves, in particular those related to eco-
nomic prospects in the world economy as a whole. Recent studies of glob-
al economic prospects conducted by international organizations have noted
the effect that depressed global growth can have on developing economies.
The World Bank suggests, for instance, that in 2008 the global economic
slowdown would contribute to lowering growth rates in the developing
world by 1.5 percent.17 While global economic prognoses have suggested
that the negative consequences of slowdowns in industrialized countries
could be mitigated by continued growth in emerging economies, the eco-
nomic downturn related to financial crises in industrialized countries has al-
so led to reduced growth rates in economies such as China and India, un-
derlining that economic performance in these regions has not been “decou-
pled” from the economic fortunes of advanced industrial states (IMF 2008).
Because investment in Africa has traditionally come primarily from indus-
trialized countries, if market demand in these economies is depressed due
to declining growth rates, this may also impact the supply of investment
from these countries. Just as poor economic performance in industrialized
countries has been offset in recent years by the performance of emerging
market economies, engines of growth may also offer a source of investment
that could compensate for dropping investment from industrialized coun-
tries. However, these emerging economies may not themselves continue to
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enjoy the phenomenal growth rates they have recently experienced due to
their own sensitivity to developments elsewhere in the global economy or
due to the variety of internal challenges that they face.
One important reason to underline that economic developments in Africa
are likely to be particularly sensitive to economic performance in the world
as a whole is that African economies continue to be highly dependent on
primary commodities. UNCTAD has estimated that commodities provided
79 percent of African export revenue between 2003 and 2006 (UNCTAD
2008c). Commodities prices are highly vulnerable to fluctuations in global
supply and demand. While there has been a boom in commodities prices in
recent years, a global economic slowdown could be detrimental to com-
modities producers not only because of a drop in export earnings, but also
because a fall in prices may discourage foreign investment in these coun-
tries.
How the global economic context will evolve is presented in this study as
another key uncertainty in examining the future of investment flows to the
African continent.
The broad contours of the scenarios that are constructed are structured
around the following two key questions that reflect the critical uncertainties
just identified. The first question is: will the African continent witness
deepening political stability, or will political tensions increase, leading the
security situation to deteriorate? The second question is: will the global
economy be expansive in nature, stimulating increases in the supply of di-
rect investment, or will the global economy contract, depressing market de-
mand outside of Africa and decreasing the flow of investment?
The organization of the scenarios around these key questions does not nec-
essarily mean that other drivers of change are not incorporated into the sto-
rylines. Indeed, because scenarios seek to explore complex relationships
between drivers of change, the treatment of factors beyond these central
factors of uncertainty is essential in crafting compelling storylines. As in a
theatrical or cinematic context, key plotlines unfold against a backdrop that
can provide additional information about why particular events occur. In
the narratives that follow, factors such as political leadership, the quality of
multilateral cooperation, and policy choices in and outside of Africa play
supporting roles in moving the stories forward, even as the key drivers dis-
cussed above provide the narratives with their central logic.
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2.6 Scenarios on the future of foreign investment and
development in Africa
This section presents four scenarios that provide pictures of how invest-
ment patterns toward Africa could evolve toward the year 2030. Before the
individual narratives are presented, a word of caution is in order. It is im-
portant to stress that these scenarios serve an exploratory purpose and are
not intended to provide hard predictions about what will happen in the fu-
ture. Even if the storylines have some factual basis, they can essentially be
interpreted as fictional accounts of how the future may unfold. Moreover,
these scenarios can be considered to be first-generation scenarios that
should be read critically. They are laden with assumptions that the reader
can (and should) question.
Each narrative follows a similar structure, describing key developments
across three discrete time periods (2010–2015, 2015–2020, and 2020–
2030). The narratives are written from a retrospective standpoint, that is,
from the perspective of an observer in 2030 reviewing developments in in-
vestment patterns over the past two decades. Figure 2.4 provides a repre-
sentation of how the scenarios relate to one another by placing them along
a scenario matrix with axes relating to the nature of political stability on the
African continent on the one hand and the state of the global economy on
the other.
2.6.1 Scenario 1: L’Essor Africain
It is an understatement to note that the African continent today is a far cry
from the dismal picture painted of the region in the media and in the inter-
national development community itself in the 1990s and in the early years
of the 21st century. As we head into the 30s, it is worthwhile to look back
at the developments that have helped to transform the continent from a
largely marginalized outpost in the global economy to a thriving part of to-
day’s dynamic world marketplace and a magnet for foreign direct invest-
ment.
Clearly, the last two decades have not erased decades of accumulated dis-
advantages related to social development on the continent. And as in other
world regions, the challenges of limiting inequalities and maintaining so-
cial cohesion remain great. The economic progress of the African continent
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has nevertheless been remarkable. While many individuals and organiza-
tions have contributed to sustained economic growth rates, this success can
primarily be attributed to a confluence of two key forces: the favourability
of global economic conditions and rising political stability within African
countries themselves.
2010–2015
As the deadline for the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals
approached, manyAfrican countries still had far to go in order to reach Mil-
lennium targets focused on expanding levels of educational attainment, im-
proving health care, and reducing poverty through growth in productive
sectors of the economy. While aid donors, hitting an economic rough patch
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Figure 2.4: Scenario matrix: The future of foreign investment and
development in Africa *)
*) This picture presents the key dimensions of uncertainty around which the four scenar-
ios have been constructed. One axis of the matrix represents the level of political
stability on the African continent, while the other reflects a variable state of the global
economy that might increase or decrease the supply of investment.
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due in part to the fallout from a major financial crisis, had made the
achievement of these goals more difficult by reneging on financial pledges
they had made at international conferences just a few years earlier, African
countries were also not helped by the relative dearth of private investment
on the continent at the time.
The impending failure of many African countries to meet the Millennium
Development Goals was disappointing to many policymakers since the
continent had been making obvious strides in improving the underlying
conditions that supported economic growth, including strengthening
governance structures and improving financial management. As 2015
rolled around, the unmet objectives presented African leaders and donor
governments with food for thought about how to address persisting devel-
opment challenges.
2015–2020
The recognition that Africa continued to lag behind other regions of the
world in terms of economic and social development encouraged African
leaders to redouble efforts to enhance stability on the continent. Fearing
that their own country’s reputations would suffer from continuing violence
in their regional neighbourhoods, Southern andWestAfrican leaders helped
to broker lasting settlements to political conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Zim-
babwe, and worked to develop regional response mechanisms to small-
scale flare-ups in order to prevent a resurgence of ethnic conflict. In this
process they were supported by international actors, who provided increas-
ing assistance to sustain democratic transitions and support post-conflict re-
construction in war-torn areas. At the same time, many countries had ben-
efited from efforts to stimulate private sector development. Although the
early benefits of these initiatives seemed to be imbalanced, a take-off in lo-
cal entrepreneurial activity helped to reinforce support for further govern-
mental openness, and signs of increasing democratic consolidation were ev-
ident in numerous countries.
As African governments found strength in democratic consolidation and
sought to reinforce existing regional security initiatives, the state of the
world economy provided a strong impetus for the acceleration of growth in
Africa as well. Emerging market economies in Asia had been driving glob-
al growth over the previous decade, and the development of their internal
markets and continuing income growth encouraged foreign expansion of
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their firms. This expansion occurred across industrial sectors. The demand
for natural resources, and particularly minerals, remained high, but due to
land scarcity in Asia, where rising incomes had raised consumption levels,
Asian firms became increasingly active investors in agricultural production
on the African continent as well. Sustained high commodity prices provid-
ed a steady revenue stream for African governments that allowed for in-
creasing public investment directed toward improving the quality of phys-
ical infrastructure and the human capital stock.
While poorer Asian countries still represented a primary destination for
Chinese outward investment in the manufacturing sector, the potential for
efficiency gains through lower labour costs in Africa enticed more Chinese
manufacturing firms to establish a foothold on the continent as well. Asian
firms were not alone in taking a larger interest in Africa in this period. In-
vestment agreements between the core OECD countries and African na-
tions continued to multiply, and the rising concentration of African popula-
tions in urban centres encouraged firms specializing in services to set up
shop in many locales. European investors, benefiting from government in-
centives to set up manufacturing operations in Northern African countries
(an offshoot of intensified European efforts to slow migration and prevent
regional instability) increasingly established manufacturing plants in their
regional backyard.
2020–2030
Already by 2020, the progress toward economic diversification was per-
ceptible across the African continent. The wisdom of the leaders of former
commodity-dependent countries who proposed that these countries should
use their resource revenues to make investments that supported sustainable
private sector growth was largely confirmed when the price of oil dropped
sharply on the world market in 2023, reflecting progress in major consum-
ing countries in adhering to their Copenhagen commitments to reduce car-
bon emissions and the takeoff in the development of alternative energy
technologies.
This drop in oil prices was not in fact bad news for manyAfrican countries.
This was not only because non-oil producing countries had generally expe-
rienced lower growth rates due to the costs of fuel imports, but also because
the drop reflected an important reality in the world economy as a whole.
Steady growth in the tertiary sector had been the driving force of econom-
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ic dynamism globally, and many firms looked increasingly to Africa as a
new frontier for investment in financial services, telecommunications, and
tourism. Dar es Salaam, a favoured destination of investment from finan-
cial services providers from the Gulf States and from Indian IT firms, be-
came a major hub of economic growth in East Africa.
The positive global economic climate had privileged some African coun-
tries more than others. Larger countries, such as Egypt, Kenya, Tanzania,
and South Africa continued to attract more attention from outside investors
than smaller countries on the continent. Realizing that differential econom-
ic success could be attributed to the advantages of market size, some small
countries sought to push harder for strengthened regional economic inte-
gration. Building on the political achievements within the West African
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) in particular, economic integra-
tion in West Africa was viewed as a continental success story. Governments
in the region prepared for the launch of the common currency that would
unite the WAEMU and the West African Monetary Zone.
Elsewhere on the continent, the Southern African Development Communi-
ty (SADC) also saw a deepening of its economic integration initiatives,
though plans to establish a monetary union had been further postponed giv-
en continued convergence difficulties outside of the economic motors in its
Southern core. While strengthening trade and investment ties to other re-
gions of the world remained a high priority for African governments, these
regional integration initiatives were of course also intended to strengthen
intra-regional economic linkages in order to contribute to continued efforts
to dampen the potential for conflict. Given differential progress toward eco-
nomic integration at a sub-regional level, it was understandable that inte-
gration on a continental level remained incomplete, yet African initiatives
to promote trade and investment had brought dividends, particularly in
drawing the attention of foreign investors in the region’s growing markets.
The investment climate in Africa today is as good as it has been anytime in
the last twenty years. The influx of capital from foreign firms seems to have
had the effect of positive reinforcement of the decisions that many African
nations have taken to improve the framework conditions for domestic and
international investors, notably through enhancing the security context and
following through on promised governance reforms. Africa is no longer a
forgotten continent. Indeed, quite the opposite is true. In the space of a cou-
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ple of decades, Africa has become a major engine of growth in the world
economy in its own right.
2.6.2 Scenario 2: The lucky few
It used to be the case that in discussions of world development problems or
global economic prospects, the countries of the African continent could be
unproblematically lumped together. These countries, and the region as a
whole, seemed often to compare unfavourably to countries in other geo-
graphic regions on measures of economic, social, and political develop-
ment. In relation to other regions of the world, the African continent ap-
peared to be uniquely passed over in terms of attracting the benefits of the
globalized world economy and peculiarly prone to devastating internal con-
flicts.
The varied fortunes of African countries over the last couple of decades
have encouraged commentators to move away from such blanket treat-
ments of development on the African continent. The distance between the
continent’s success stories and its poor performers has widened noticeably.
In a global context that has been generally favourable for economic growth,
these quite divergent trajectories that African countries have taken primari-
ly reflect persistent variation in the capacity of African governments to
avoid internal turmoil.
2010–2015
According to the experts, the outlook for the African continent as a whole
looked generally favourable heading into the teens. It was clear that many
countries would fall short of meeting the Millennium Development Goals,
but on the positive side the continent had witnessed recent progress toward
resolving conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, and
in West Africa, and governments across the continent were praised for their
judicious macroeconomic management. While the global economic slow-
down had contributed to reduced investment flows at the beginning of this
period, these picked up as Asian engines of growth continued to power for-
ward. Demand for commodities remained strong internationally, and in-
vestments in natural resources continued to be robust.
The patterns of direct investment to Africa in this period showed continuity
with trends that had been developing over the previous decade. This was
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not only because natural resources remained the main draw for investors in
the oil and mineral rich economies of the continent, but also because the
concentration of investment continued to display a pattern that favoured a
small handful of African countries. Morocco and Egypt welcomed the most
diversified basket of investments, as the legislative output of previous re-
form-minded governments, especially their competition policies, seemed to
bear fruit in shaping economic practice in these countries. Information tech-
nology companies were all too happy to take advantage of the young and
urban demographics that these markets offered them.At the other end of the
continent, South Africa’s star also continued to shine brightly in the eyes of
international investors.
2015–2020
Given the continuing rise of particular African economies, there were
grounds for optimism about how the continent as a whole would develop in
the future. Because the volume of investment (still directed primarily to-
ward natural resources) had increased so significantly in recent years, ques-
tions about the continued need for public financing for development be-
came increasingly prominent in development assistance debates in donor
countries. Yet as many development advocacy groups began to signal, this
increased investment was not necessarily a blessing, because the economic
benefits that it generated were not widely distributed.
In spite of the international rhetoric in previous decades that governance re-
forms were a prerequisite for increasing countries’ attractiveness to invest-
ment, competition among multinational firms for lucrative contracts in ex-
tractive industries led them to overlook persisting shortfalls in progress to-
ward achieving anti-corruption goals in particular. Nowhere were the per-
verse effects of incoming investment more apparent than in Nigeria, where
the country’s recent progress toward combating patronage more or less
grinded to a halt: while the Caribbean real estate market seemed to benefit
from the expanding revenue stream of the Nigerian elite, the quality of in-
frastructure in the country as a whole noticeably deteriorated.
The declining conditions for much of the Nigerian population served as a
source of internal tension within the country. Not only was crime an in-
creasing problem in the slums of major cities due to the limited job oppor-
tunities outside of extractive industries, but unrest in rural areas mounted as
well, given high fuel costs in spite of ample domestic oil production and the
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minimal expenditures in the area of social services allocated toward rural
regions. While large oil multinationals reacted to the worsening security
context by establishing sometimes extensive private security forces to pro-
tect their assets, the government’s approach to preserving order focused on
increasing the repressive capacities of the state itself.
These developments were detrimental for a variety of reasons. Within Nige-
ria, the inability of the state to maintain a stable security situation meant
that investors outside of the resource sector were wary of entering the mar-
ket, even if it had the potential to be one of Africa’s largest and most lucra-
tive domestic markets. Because of its internal instability, Nigeria’s contri-
bution to regional conflict-reduction initiatives was also quite limited.
Meanwhile the resolution of conflict on the continent seemed to be an ever
greater challenge, as many resource-rich countries followed Nigeria’s ex-
ample. The struggle for control over resource revenues led many observers
to question whether African borders were finally headed toward a post-
colonial adjustment on a grand scale.
2020–2030
Even as major resource producers experienced increasing internal tensions,
several economies on the continent continued to experience broad-based
growth. The best performers continued to be countries at the edges of the
continent: Egypt, Morocco, Tanzania, and South Africa. The lessons these
countries had learned from the difficulties that neighbouring countries had
experienced in trying to maintain order was to tie their own economies
more directly to the countries in their international trading networks rather
than to invest political resources attempting to deal with difficult internal
conflicts in neighbouring states.
The bilateral relationships between these countries and the European Union
became an increasingly central component of their foreign relations, and
EU countries continued to direct development aid resources to these states
in order to further develop their trade relationships. This did not mean that
theAfrican countries with strong and balanced economic performance were
indifferent to conflict on the continent, but they reacted primarily by taking
measures to increase their own internal security, notably by undertaking
stricter border controls. The imposition of stricter worker entry require-
ments was a clear response to the increasing migration pressures from poor-
er neighbouring countries.
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Political leaders in the strong economic performers found it politically ad-
vantageous to limit their regional engagements. Allowing increased migra-
tion was viewed by the populations of these countries as a potential threat
to the systems of domestic redistribution whose development had accom-
panied the increasing embeddedness of these economies in international
trade networks. These countries also did not consider their past success to
be dependent on the performance of their neighbouring countries, and per-
ceived their peer group to be other global economic success stories rather
than countries they shared a common continental address with. On the brink
of this new decade, the wisdom of these states in distancing themselves
from the troubles in other parts of Africa appears to be ready for a major
test. The renewal of internal conflict across Central and West Africa could
spark a new recognition of the urgency of developing regional security
mechanisms. Or these countries may simply batten down their hatches, en-
suring that development on the African continent will continue to move at
varied speeds.
2.6.3 Scenario 3: Weathering the storm
Thirty years ago, “globalization” was the buzzword that launched a thou-
sand publications. The term described the changing quality of the world
economy, which was characterized by the expansion of trade and invest-
ment flows, the acceleration of technological change, the ready diffusion of
information, and an unprecedented level of interdependence among nation-
al economies. Globalization was not always considered in positive terms.
For some, it was thought to be propelled forward by private corporations
that benefited disproportionately from these economic integration process-
es in relation to workers and other disadvantaged populations. Others point-
ed to negative aspects of the increased facility of cross-border movements
and technological diffusion such as the rise in human trafficking and the
growth of terror networks and transnational crime syndicates.
Whatever the assessment of globalization, there were few academic authors
or journalists who doubted that the acceleration of economic integration
that had been taking place would continue in the coming decades. Devel-
opments in the world economy in the last two decades have not vindicated
that assumption. While the global economy today still bears the marks of
that period of accelerated market integration, “globalization” has now lost
its momentum. The economic downturn in much of the world has rein-
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forced the national dimensions of economic organization and highlighted
the differential capacities of states to respond to major economic chal-
lenges.
Though the waters of the global economy have been choppy over the last
twenty years, African economies that one might have expected to be the
most vulnerable to the global economic downturn have navigated these wa-
ters remarkably well. While declining external finance from private and
public sources depressed their opportunities for growth, the domestic re-
form processes that produced a favourable climate for productive invest-
ment and promised more widely distributed economic opportunities pro-
vided a basis for political stability that laid a foundation for growth in the
absence of ideal international economic conditions.
2010–2015
Africa was receiving a healthy amount of good press around 2010. Major
international organizations bestowed praise on leaders across the continent
for their continuing efforts to maintain solid macroeconomic fundamentals.
The agenda of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),
which promoted strengthened intra-regional trade ties, improved govern-
ance, and enhanced cooperation on security issues among other goals, en-
joyed widespread support fromAfrican leaders, who viewed cooperation on
a regional level as the main vehicle for graduating from their marginalized
position in the world economy.
The emphasis that African leaders placed on improving their physical and
governmental infrastructures produced clear short-term gains. Sensing po-
tential in a growing market, multinational firms in the natural resources sec-
tor increasingly diversified their activities on the continent and invested
growing sums in processing activities in particular. A shortage of skilled
labour meant that investment in manufacturing was still growing only slow-
ly, however Asian firms were expanding their presence in the manufactur-
ing sector as well as in the primary sector. These manufacturing invest-
ments had a perceptible influence on climbing employment figures in a
number of Southern and Western African countries in particular.
2015–2020
In September 2015, an impressive gathering of world leaders convened in
New York to commemorate the Millennium Summit that had been held fif-
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teen years earlier. The tone of the 2015 summit was more subdued than the
tone of the meeting in 2000: the failure of the international community to
reach the lofty goals set out then seemed to have scaled back expectations
among many participants. Yet the gathering did provide an opportunity to
highlight some emerging development success stories. The diversification
of sources of development finance was regarded as one of the more impor-
tant changes in the global development landscape, and India and China
were praised for the contributions that they had made to development in
Southern and Eastern Africa in particular through their increased aid fund-
ing and investment promotion policies.
The world economy had seen its share of ups and downs in the lead up to
2015, but increased regulation of financial institutions in the United States
and in other OECD countries along with other government measures to
strengthen domestic markets seemed to have contributed to lowered eco-
nomic vulnerability in many of the world’s leading economies.
If domestic economic policy choices had placed the US and other industri-
alized countries on a sound footing, however, few countries were prepared
for the coming global shock that resulted from the stumbling Chinese econ-
omy. Growth in China had been a major engine of global growth. Its facto-
ries produced cheap imports for consumers across the world and its large
open internal market was an enticing destination for many exporters. Its
steady demand for the natural resources that fed its factories had also en-
sured persistently high commodities prices. Perhaps because of these eco-
nomic virtues, underlying political problems in China were overlooked by
many economic analysts. China’s mounting internal challenges were nev-
ertheless significant. Key sources of tension included the country’s grow-
ing surplus of men, mounting environmental problems, and widening in-
equalities between coastal regions and the interior. In 2017, a spate of rev-
elations about the contamination of major water supplies spawned protests
across the country. The government’s efforts to suppress these protests on-
ly angered the demonstrators further, however. Demonstrations continued
to multiply and spread beyond environmental issues to take up questions of
economic justice and political expression. The Chinese state faced a major
threat to continued internal cohesion.
The Chinese motor of world growth did not grind to a complete halt, but its
internal difficulties did lead to a significant drop in output and declining
Building long-term scenarios for development
German Development Institute 87
DI08-0985 Studie 40:Layout 1  16.12.2008  14:17 Uhr  Seite 87
consumption. This had a ripple effect on other economies, including the
United States, which stood to lose thousands of export-related jobs as a re-
sult. It also had ripple effects on African economies. The drop in com-
modities prices that resulted from depressed demand in China was regard-
ed as a major setback to key commodity exporters on the continent. Many
observers of the business environment in African countries also began to
question how the growing crisis would affect the activities of the state-
owned firms that had established operations in the region.
2020–2030
By the beginning of the 20s, the braking effect that the Chinese slowdown
had had on the rest of the world economy became increasingly evident.
While vulnerable commodity-dependent countries in Africa had been ad-
versely affected by the economic downturn, the early response of OECD
countries to the downturn seemed to close off other opportunities for gen-
erating trade and investment that would offset declining trade with China.
OECD governments faced populist pressures to impose new protectionist
measures, while firms headquartered there responded to the reversal of for-
tune in China by trying to limit their exposure to risk internationally. In
many corporate boardrooms, refocusing operations in OECD countries be-
came a high priority. Yet for many manufacturing firms, shifting production
back to putatively safer OECD countries did not seem like a viable option:
not only were the labour costs too great but the firms also recognized that
they would be competing for a share of a shrinking labour pool. The silver
lining of the Chinese downturn forAfrican economies thus seemed to be the
increasing attention paid by European manufacturing multinationals in the
region.
These multinationals were attracted not only by low labour costs but by the
stable political footing that African economies were built on. The continen-
tal initiatives such as NEPAD had not only proven their worth in establish-
ing better framework conditions for foreign investors; they also served as
important forums for exchanging ideas about how to stave off rising inter-
nal tensions in a continent marked by its ethnic diversity and growing ru-
ral-urban cleavages. In that context, some observers pointed to the mixed
blessing that the new inflows of investment in manufacturing might bring
due to the increased concentration of wealth in key coastal areas, but
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emerging initiatives such as an effort to stimulate regional agricultural trade
suggested that African leaders were actively anticipating these potential
negative outcomes and working to prevent them from materializing. While
global investment flows had dropped in the aftermath of the Chinese crisis,
the effect of these developments within Africa was to allow the continent to
attract an increasing share of global investment. In the face of global eco-
nomic turbulence, Africa seemed to be weathering the storm better than ex-
pected.
2.6.4 Scenario 4: The lost continent
In the early years of the 21st century, there was a “big push” of publicity on
the development potential of the African continent. The persistence of wide
scale poverty across the region and humanitarian catastrophes resulting
from dislocation in Sudan and in the Great Lakes region motivated intense
political advocacy in the world’s wealthiest countries in support of increas-
ing available financial resources to support development efforts. While ac-
knowledging the difficult challenges that lay ahead for many African coun-
tries regardless of the changed outlook for development finance, the over-
all tone of the campaigns of these development advocates was overwhelm-
ingly optimistic. They presented a picture of a continent where home-
grown entrepreneurs were injecting a new dynamism into historically un-
derdeveloped markets and saw a potential for intensified trade and invest-
ment relationships that would benefit wealthy European and North Ameri-
can countries and African countries alike.
Looking at broad economic growth trends heading into the year 2010, this
optimism seemed to be well-founded. Driven by a resource boom and
steady growth in regional economic motors, many African economies were
expanding at a high rate. There continued to be pockets of instability on the
continent, notably along the Chadian-Sudanese border, in the Horn of
Africa, and in the Eastern Congo, but in West Africa and Angola, recent
peace settlements seemed to be holding up well. In spite of those trends, the
high hopes of the development advocates have largely been dashed in the
last twenty years, which have seen a resurgence of political violence on the
continent and a decline in international interest, due to the continent’s own
political and economic difficulties and the inward-looking focus of many of
the world’s wealthier nations.
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2010–2015
Expanding investment flows were viewed as a key success story in the
years leading up to 2015. The African continent was becoming a major
source of ores and minerals used in the production of consumer electronics
and an important supplier to Asian manufacturers. After a short-lived dip in
prices, demand for oil resumed its climb internationally, and increased pro-
duction in the Gulf of Guinea made the region the largest international oil
supplier to the large US market. For many firms in the natural resources
sector, the potential of the African continent still appeared to be largely un-
tapped. This was especially true of possible mining concessions in Central
African countries, yet multinational firms remained cautious about entering
agreements with the governments of these countries due to their tenuous
holds on power. Diplomats in Kinshasa often noted that the effective size
of the territory under control of the central government of the DRC was still
an open question.
Internal tensions in the DRC seemed to be bubbling to the surface to an in-
creasing degree. Government efforts to create a modern capital at the cen-
tre ofAfrica had apparently inspired discontent in the provinces, where eco-
nomic conditions had not improved noticeably in recent years. The coun-
try’s experience with decentralization seemed also to fuel the political am-
bitions of local leaders eager to benefit more directly from the exploitation
of their region’s natural resources. The unresolved refugee problem in East-
ern parts of the country only added to the tensions. However, at this point
in time the DRC appeared to be more vulnerable than many of its African
neighbours, as incoming receipts from extractive industries had allowed
governments to add to their capacity to maintain internal security.
2015–2020
The profitability of natural resource extraction had led to an increasing na-
tionalization of extractive industries. While many states initially lacked the
know-how to manage these industries and were therefore dependent on
joint-venture arrangements with foreign firms, by the late teens several
states felt they had developed the expertise necessary to take an even
stronger role in the management of these enterprises. For the political lead-
ers behind this movement, one advantage seemed to be the alignment of the
resource revenue with governmental priorities. It was not a coincidence that
large prestige projects multiplied in African capitals during these years.
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The decade-long rise in demand for commodities had lulled numerous
African leaders into believing that they could expect a safe revenue stream
for many years to come. But in 2018, the global economic context changed
dramatically in comparison to previous years. The expanding democratic
protest movements across China introduced a new degree of economic un-
certainty into the former motor of the world economy. The significant drop
in economic growth in China that followed not only contributed to a glob-
al drop in commodities prices, it also gave investors in major capital-rich
countries a scare about investing in developing markets.
With high commodities prices, African political leaders in resource-rich
countries could contribute to political stability by distributing their resource
rents widely. As public budgets tightened due to declining revenue, the days
of government largesse seemed to be at an end. This was not only a prob-
lem for leaders because they had previously used budgets to help dampen
the ambitions of political rivals but also because certain segments of the
population which had benefited from government support, notably urban
populations, were increasingly denied government services they had come
to depend on. Struggles for political power coupled with increasing unrest
in the cities fuelled a wave of skirmishes between government forces and
protestors. The ability of governments to maintain order across their terri-
tories became severely tested.
2020–2030
By 2022, the security situation on the continent had deteriorated signifi-
cantly. The war in Eastern Congo was intensifying, imposing new chal-
lenges on neighbouring countries like Zambia and Tanzania that had been
making great strides in building up the domestic infrastructure to attract in-
creasing investment in the previous decades. Both countries had enjoyed a
small boom in investment driven by growth in the tourism sector in partic-
ular. The increasing demands that securing national borders placed on these
countries generated additional economic strains, reducing their ability to
upgrade their physical infrastructure and invest in social services.
Indeed, spending on security increased across the continent. In the coun-
tries experiencing internal unrest, this increased security spending was ef-
fectively leading to a significant resurgence in the small arms. The preva-
lence of conflict made it difficult for any single African government to act
as a force for promoting conflict resolution initiatives on a regional level.
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Several of the continent’s largest countries (Sudan, Nigeria, DRC) had been
among the most significantly affected by the resource bust. While South
Africa continued to have a strong economic base and stable political sys-
tem, it too, was preoccupied with the task of securing its own borders to
prevent massive refugee flows from conflict-ridden regions to its North.
These efforts to tighten border control further impaired intra-regional trade
flows.
The response of European and North American countries to Africa’s de-
clining fortunes was very similar to South Africa’s. The scale of the prob-
lems appeared to be too daunting to risk any kind of international interven-
tion. At the same time, political support for economic assistance was low in
this general economic slump. Instead of trying to address another conti-
nent’s problems, the leading industrialized countries decided to invest in-
creasing amounts of resources in border defences. Firms in these countries
followed the general orientation of their governments by increasing their
search for business opportunities within mature industrialized economies
and largely forgetting about the economic potential of the African conti-
nent.
2.7 Conclusion
The scenarios presented in the previous section provide skeletal treatments
of how investment patterns and development prospects on the African con-
tinent might change over the next twenty years. The stories suggest that
constructing a narrative that explores the evolution of these phenomena
over such a long period requires an appreciation for the complexity of fac-
tors contributing not only to the way that investment is distributed globally
but also to how development processes unfold.
To construct a more detailed portrait of how investment to Africa could
evolve over the next two decades, the scenarios hint that it would be nec-
essary to answer a variety of questions about different components of the
investment story in greater depth. One question relates to how individual
countries will develop to make themselves more or less attractive to foreign
investors. There is clearly greater diversity on the African continent than
the existing scenarios acknowledge. The investment trajectory for Nigeria
is likely to differ from that of Tanzania, for example, so exploring variations
in the likely political and economic futures of these states would be an in-
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formative input to a scenario exercise dealing with the broader question of
how FDI to Africa could evolve.
This analysis also highlighted that not all forms of investment follow the
same kind of logic, both in terms of what motivates investors and in terms
of the nature of the effects that this investment is likely to produce. Anoth-
er means of strengthening the existing analysis would be to break down sec-
toral FDI patterns to African countries and to explore the dynamics of
change within these sectors. Beyond examining prospects for investment in
natural resources, in manufacturing, and in services, one could further de-
compose investment according to industries, for example by looking at in-
vestment in textiles production or in tourism. In addition to shedding light
on the broad question related to how investment patterns will change, such
exercises could also serve to illustrate the varied developmental benefits of
different types of investment.
The scenarios also stressed that in examining evolving international invest-
ment patterns, factors related to the performance of the world economy may
be especially relevant drivers of change. Here, too, an additional set of
analyses would be beneficial in assuring the plausibility of scenario story-
lines. Assessing the prospects for continued outward investment within ma-
jor FDI sender countries itself requires a general understanding of their eco-
nomic and political prospects as well as an appreciation for how these con-
ditions would influence the decision making calculus of firms headquar-
tered in these countries.
As the summary of areas for further analysis under the umbrella of the “FDI
to Africa” question indicates, the presentation of scenarios may leave read-
ers with more questions than answers. This might be viewed as a positive
result of an exercise that is designed to stimulate thinking. In questioning
the assumptions on which divergent storylines are based, readers are con-
fronted with their own assumptions about the relationships between impor-
tant drivers of change, and such an exercise may help to clarify what mech-
anisms researchers see as especially important in contributing to political,
economic, or social transformation in the future.
At the same time, these open questions also underline that there are clear
limitations to building scenarios as these scenarios have been built, i.e.
through desk research conducted by a lone researcher. While existing theo-
retical and empirical work can certainly inform scenario logics and provide
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a foundation for developing long-term narratives, such an approach also
carries the risk of being backward-looking and not sufficiently open to in-
novative thinking that might emerge in a scenario development process that
involves a larger number of people.
In spite of these limitations, such scenarios may be useful to policymakers
for several reasons. First, policymakers may use these fictional storylines to
compare the views of the future that they present with their own view of fu-
ture trends in a particular area. This type of comparison should encourage
policymakers to think about why their own “official future” might come to
pass and what might disrupt progress toward the occurrences of the future
that they regard as particularly desirable. Second, policymakers may iden-
tify desirable outcomes in the fictional scenarios, and can then generate
ideas about what types of policy choices could lead to these positive out-
comes, broadening their menu of policy options. Finally, scenario exercis-
es can be used to evaluate the robustness of existing strategies. Current pol-
icy approaches can be assessed in relation to how well they can confront the
challenges presented or how well they might be able to capitalize on the op-
portunities outlined in individual narratives. This type of evaluation should
serve to identify the limitations of existing approaches and to suggest new
priorities.
It is important to underline that scenarios such as those presented in this
study do not by themselves provide a clear roadmap for action. They may
illuminate key forces at work in a particular issue area or draw out the im-
plications of a specific type of policy intervention, but because they present
multiple futures as equally valid, they leave policymakers with many op-
tions in terms of how to interpret the narratives and to determine what types
of consequences potential future developments have for their organization-
al priorities. If policymakers might be disappointed by the lack of a clear
guide for action that scenarios by themselves provide, they may neverthe-
less appreciate using scenarios as tools for examining policy options.
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3 Scenario analysis and global development:
Considerations for policymakers
Recent crises in the world economy related to rising food prices and turbu-
lent global financial markets have highlighted the difficulty that policy-
makers often face in anticipating future challenges. Scenario analysis pro-
vides a tool that can help to prepare organizations such as development aid
agencies to enlarge their thinking about possible future occurrences and to
better prepare for them. Building on the general overview of scenario
analysis methods provided in the previous sections of this study, this final
section offers a short list of points for policymakers interested in enhancing
their capacity for long-term thinking to take into consideration.
These points for reflection can be summarized as follows. First, the con-
clusion highlights that to determine whether scenario analysis is an appro-
priate addition to a policy planning toolkit, an organization should evaluate
existing practices for collecting information about and planning for the fu-
ture as a point of departure. Under the second and third headings of this sec-
tion, central factors that contribute to the success of scenario development
projects are briefly outlined. These success factors include involving a di-
verse variety of participants to promote novel thinking and limiting the
scope of the scenario exercise to avoid overly generalized portraits of the
future from emerging. The penultimate paragraph suggests that policymak-
ers might consider using existing scenario studies to evaluate their strate-
gies even though doing so limits the learning potential that might derive
from participation in the scenario development process. Finally, the con-
cluding paragraph underlines that policymakers need to adopt realistic ex-
pectations about what scenario building can accomplish. As a method, sce-
nario analysis may produce fewer ready policy recommendations than pol-
icymakers desire.
Necessity of assessing existing planning and information processing
practices
Scenario analysis methods were developed in corporate and governmental
settings in response to dissatisfaction with existing planning tools. One
starting point for considering whether scenario analysis is an appropriate
addition to an organization’s planning portfolio is therefore an evaluation of
current planning practice within the organization. If an organization is con-
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cerned that it has been unable to adequately confront important challenges
in its external environment, there may be culprits other than the research
methods favoured by the planning staff to take into consideration. In the de-
velopment policy context, for example, it could be useful to reflect on how
well channels for communication between field-level implementing agents
and headquarters facilitate an open flow of information about emerging
challenges in disparate parts of the world that can inform policy planning
within the organization.
Another possible explanation for sub-optimal preparation for emerging
problems relates to an organization’s commitment to research in general. If
an aid agency has a limited capacity to collect information about the pres-
ent state of affairs in developing countries, it may be difficult for the or-
ganization to anticipate problems that lie around the corner. Finally, devel-
oping a long-term view may be difficult for an agency if a planning depart-
ment’s responsibilities focus overwhelmingly on responding to short-term
political demands. Ensuring that there is capacity within the policy plan-
ning department of an aid agency to reflect on potential long-term changes
would likely help to enhance future-oriented thinking within the organiza-
tion, regardless of whether scenario analysis methods are applied in the pol-
icy planning process. At the same time, an aid agency’s investments in re-
search that is not explicitly future-oriented can also enhance possible sce-
nario-building efforts, since such exercises can integrate knowledge pro-
duced through a variety of channels.
Necessity of mobilizing internal and external knowledge to stimulate
innovative thinking
Scenario analysis offers the potential to provide a supplement to existing re-
search efforts to better understand the state of the world and can serve to
spur thinking about the different directions that future developments could
take. According to proponents of the method, one of its key virtues is to
deal directly with future uncertainties by using key uncertainties as a basis
for developing varied storylines about how the future may unfold. The
identification of critical uncertainties generally takes place both by tapping
the expertise of people working within the organization and by soliciting in-
put from external experts that offer diverse perspectives on the questions in
focus.
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These two means of gathering input for scenario exercises correspond to
two main elements of success in scenario building. First of all, the literature
on scenario analysis emphasizes that for scenarios to be useful in stretching
the mental maps that guide decision making within an organization it is im-
portant that there is strong managerial ownership of a scenario exercise. Di-
rect participation in the scenario development process by key officials with-
in the organization may not only contribute to ensuring that the scenario ex-
ercise reflects questions related to central organizational priorities but can
also provide direct benefits to the participants by providing a forum for
them to articulate and question their own assumptions about why future de-
velopments might occur.
At the same time, the process of developing varied pictures of how the fu-
ture could evolve can be enhanced by efforts to incorporate a diverse vari-
ety of participants in this process. Aid agencies with operations in numer-
ous developing countries likely already have a large network of potential
contributors that could be activated in preparing alternative futures of the
context that development policy will have to respond to. Such networks
would include non-governmental organizations and business associations
with country or region-specific knowledge. Governmental representatives
and academics could also be invited to contribute to scenario building
processes, for example through short structured workshops that feed into a
broader scenario building effort undertaken by the organization leading the
effort. Including a variety of stakeholders in scenario development efforts
can strengthen the legitimacy of the final product in addition to fostering in-
novative thinking by incorporating diverse viewpoints into the process.
Necessity of limiting the scope of scenario exercises
While scenario analysis is by itself considered to be a method that allows
organizations to manage complexity, the ability of a scenario building ex-
ercise to condense information about possible futures in a manner that is
useful to policymakers in thinking about what types of decisions they can
take to manage potential future developments can vary depending on how
the scenario effort is organized. Undertaking to answer a question as broad
as “how might the global development landscape change over the next thir-
ty years” poses a challenge due to its sheer scope. This question requires at-
tention to a multiplicity of dimensions of global change, including potential
changes in patterns of international economic exchange, in the global secu-
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rity context, and in the global environment, among other areas. Each of
these thematic areas could easily be the subject of a resource-intensive sce-
nario-building effort in its own right.
By the same token, a scenario exercise that is not limited in its geographi-
cal scope risks either becoming a mammoth undertaking or producing
sketches of the future that are at such a high level of abstraction that their
direct relevance to decisions that policymakers are faced with may be lim-
ited. In designing a scenario building effort that contributes to answering
the broader question of how the global development landscape could
evolve in the future, it would therefore be useful to restrict the geographi-
cal focus of the project as a starting point, beginning with an examination
of the future of particular developing countries or regions and using lessons
from these more focused studies to inform the broader question. If an aid
agency is considering integrating scenario analysis in its planning portfolio,
limiting the scope of initial endeavours to apply the method would also be
useful in terms of offering small-scale test cases that would allow the or-
ganization to evaluate the extent to which the approach is suitable in
achieving its specific planning goals given the nature of the resources ex-
pended.
Possibilities to learn from existing prospective studies
An alternative starting point for an agency exploring the possibility of re-
lying on scenario analysis methods to inform its planning processes would
be an examination of existing scenario exercises that have focused on top-
ics that are related to the organization’s priorities. For example, the World
Bank’s Rehearsing for the Future report provides a ready-made reference
product that aid agencies can use to explore possible developments in the
future and to judge the value of pursuing similar initiatives within their own
organizations. While a reliance on existing studies will limit the learning ef-
fects that come from direct participation in a scenario development process,
externally produced narratives may nevertheless offer an organization a
means of considering how well its existing strategy would perform in the
alternative futures described or provide a tool for opening discussion with-
in the organization more generally.
Recognizing the limitations of scenario methods
Whether aid agencies simply rely on external scenario exercises or make a
commitment to scenario building internally, it is essential that policymak-
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ers adopt a measured view of what scenario methods can accomplish.
While policymakers may understandably be enticed by a method that car-
ries the potential to identify emerging trends and challenges, it is important
to emphasize that quantitative and qualitative scenario analysis methods
alike do not present hard predictions about the future. Indeed, the results of
research produced using these methods leaves much room for interpretation
open in terms of what implications policymakers should draw from the ex-
ercises. In short, the success of scenario analysis methods in contributing to
a higher level of organizational preparedness for future challenges likely re-
quires an investment on the part of policymakers themselves in digesting
the lessons to be learned from a given scenario exercise in addition to the
sometimes significant investments that the methods demand in carrying out
the research that contributes to scenario production.
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